In re Petition of J.O. & P.O., N.B. & Ki.B., 176 A.3d 144

K.B., born October 23, 2011, was removed from his parents' care at 10 months and placed with J.O. and P.O. (appellees) as foster parents; parents stipulated to neglect in 2012.
The Child and Family Services Agency initially sought reunification; due to parental substance abuse, mental-health issues, and inconsistent visitation the permanency goal changed to adoption in January 2014; appellees petitioned to adopt on June 24, 2015.
Magistrate judge found Mr. B. unfit based on chronic mental illness (schizophrenia/schizoaffective disorder), ongoing substance use (marijuana/K2), gaps in visitation, and reliance on an unstable support system (Ms. B.); waived his consent to adoption under D.C. Code § 16-304(e).
Ms. B. testified to sobriety efforts, but after several trial days she consented in open court to the adoption; the court conducted extensive voir dire and concluded her consent was knowing and voluntary.
Ms. B. later moved to revoke consent claiming coercion, inadequate advice of counsel, incarceration, and emotional incapacity; the magistrate and associate judges denied revocation, finding her on-the-record consent voluntary and strategic.
On consolidated appeal the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed: Mr. B. unfit and withholding consent contrary to the child’s best interests; Ms. B.’s consent voluntary and not clearly erroneous.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Mr. B. is an unfit parent justifying waiver of consent	Mr. B.: court relied on stale/vague evidence about mental health and substance use	Court/appellees: evidence (Dr. King, case manager, drug tests, visitation gaps) shows serious, ongoing impairments and risk to child	Held: Mr. B. is unfit by clear and convincing evidence (not an abuse of discretion)
Whether withholding consent by Mr. B. is contrary to K.B.’s best interests (waiver under §16‑304(e))	Mr. B.: placement with parent presumed best; adoption premature	Appellees: TPR factors (continuity, health, relationships, drug activity) weigh for adoption	Held: Waiver proper; statutory TPR factors favor adoption by appellees
Whether Ms. B.’s in‑court consent was voluntary and informed	Ms. B.: consent involuntary due to incarceration, emotional distress, counsel pressure, and quid pro quo for contact agreement	Court/appellees: extensive voir dire, repeated affirmations, counsel consultation, no evidence promises conditioned on consent	Held: Consent was knowing and voluntary; motion to revoke properly denied
Whether Ms. B. received ineffective assistance of counsel affecting voluntariness	Ms. B.: counsel deficient, pressured her to sign to preserve contact	Appellees/court: no proof of deficient performance or prejudice; counsel discussed consent at length; magistrate credited contrary record	Held: No basis to find counsel ineffective or that counsel undermined voluntariness

In re Ta.L., 149 A.3d 1060 (D.C. 2016) (unfitness required before waiving parental consent)
In re S.L.G., 110 A.3d 1275 (D.C. 2015) (fitness separate from best‑interest analysis; factors for evaluating unfitness)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (parents' fundamental liberty interest in custody)
In re T.J., 666 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1995) (standard for waiving parental consent and best‑interest review)
In re J.J., 111 A.3d 1038 (D.C. 2015) (appellate standard: review for abuse of discretion and clear error)
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1981) (right to counsel in parental‑rights matters may be required by due process)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (ineffective assistance framework: performance and prejudice)
J.M.A.L. v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., 418 A.2d 133 (D.C. 1980) (consent to adoption is irrevocable absent involuntariness)