In re: Petition of J.O. & P.O., 16-FS-945 & 16-FS-946

Background

E.S., born Oct. 30, 2012, was placed in foster care with pre‑adoptive foster parents J.O. and P.O. (the O.s) after her mother K.S.—who has a documented history of severe mental illness and traumatic brain injury—was hospitalized and later adjudicated neglected.
Two competing adoption petitions were filed: the O.s (foster parents) and B.S.W./S.E.W. (the W.s), a non‑biological family identified by maternal relatives; E.S. spent substantial time with both families during the case.
On Sept. 27, 2013 K.S. executed a written consent to adoption by the W.s during a CFSA meeting; she later expressed confusion about which family she had consented to and sought to revoke consent.
The trial court found K.S. unfit to parent but determined she was mentally competent when she signed the consent, gave K.S.’s designation of the W.s “weighty consideration,” and—applying a clear‑and‑convincing burden to overcome that deference—granted adoption to the W.s.
The Court of Appeals held K.S. was not competent to designate a preferred caregiver because she could not determine her child’s best interest nor plan for the child’s future; therefore the weighty‑consideration doctrine did not apply and the case was remanded for placement decisions based solely on the child’s best interest under the TPR factors.

Issues

Issue	O.s' Argument	W.s'/CFSA (and Trial Court) Argument	Held
Whether K.S.’s executed consent was entitled to "weighty consideration"	K.S. was incompetent when she consented due to confusion and lack of treatment; her designation should not receive deference	K.S. was competent on record; her signed, notarized consent was unequivocal and merits weighty consideration	The court held K.S. was not competent; weighty consideration did not apply
Standard for assessing parental competency to designate preferred caregiver	Apply a competency standard tied to parent's ability to choose what is in child’s best interest and to plan for child’s future	Competency assessed like other legal transactions (sufficient mind to understand nature/effect of act)	The court clarified competency requires assessing (1) ability to determine child’s best interest and (2) ability to plan for child’s future
Burden of proof to determine placement when parental designation is given weighty consideration	If designation is not weighty, then preponderance standard for best interest applies	If designation is weighty, adversary must prove by clear and convincing evidence placement with chosen petitioners is contrary to child’s best interest	Held: Because K.S. was not competent, weighty consideration does not apply and placement must be decided by a preponderance‑of‑the‑evidence best‑interest analysis under the TPR factors
Whether trial court’s factual findings supported K.S.’s competency conclusion	Trial court erred: record showed confusion, limited contact, lack of treatment, and contradictory testimony undermining competency finding	Trial court credited social worker testimony and the signed consent; found no credible evidence K.S. lacked treatment or capacity	Held: trial court’s legal conclusion of competency did not flow rationally from the facts; remand required for reassessment under correct standard

Key Cases Cited

In re T.J., 666 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1995) (establishes that a parent’s designation of a preferred custodian merits weighty consideration unless the parent is not competent to decide)
In re Ta.L., 149 A.3d 1060 (D.C. 2016) (discusses fit vs. competent distinctions and application of weighty consideration in adoption/TPR context)
In re L.W., 613 A.2d 350 (D.C. 1992) (fitness determined with reference to particular child’s needs)
In re J.D.W., 711 A.2d 826 (D.C. 1998) (parent’s consent not weighty where parent failed to consider child’s best interests due to instability)
Hernandez v. Banks, 65 A.3d 59 (D.C. 2013) (contractual capacity depends on nature of transaction)
United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899 (5th Cir. 1976) (competency determination is a legal conclusion informed by but not identical to medical testimony)
Butler v. Harrison, 578 A.2d 1098 (D.C. 1990) (competency to execute agreements framed by ability to understand nature and effect of transaction)
J.M.A.L. v. Lutheran Social Servs., 418 A.2d 133 (D.C. 1980) (consent must be voluntary and made with full understanding of consequences)
In re C.A.B., 4 A.3d 890 (D.C. 2010) (once parent is found unfit by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption favoring parental placement yields to child’s best interest)
In re K.D., 26 A.3d 772 (D.C. 2011) (describes scope of weighty consideration and standard for overcoming parental preference)