In re Pers. Restraint of Ali
196 Wash. 2d 220
| Wash. | 2020Background
- Petitioner Said Omer Ali committed a series of robberies at age 16, was tried as an adult, and convicted of multiple first‑degree robberies, attempted robberies, and one assault; three counts carried mandatory deadly‑weapon enhancements.
- Under the SRA the applicable adult standard range including mandatory consecutive enhancements was 312–390 months; the trial court imposed 312 months (the statutory minimum) and said it lacked discretion to go lower because of the law.
- Ali’s judgment became final in 2011; he filed a personal restraint petition (PRP) in 2017 invoking State v. Houston‑Sconiers and RCW 10.73.100(6) (exception to the 1‑year time bar for a significant, material change in law requiring retroactive application).
- Houston‑Sconiers held that sentencing courts must consider mitigating qualities of youth and have discretion to impose any sentence below otherwise applicable SRA ranges/enhancements when the offender is a juvenile.
- The Supreme Court held Houston‑Sconiers is a significant, material, substantive Eighth Amendment rule that must be applied retroactively; it found Ali demonstrated actual and substantial prejudice and remanded for resentencing consistent with Houston‑Sconiers.
Issues
| Issue | Ali's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Houston‑Sconiers is a significant and material change in law that overcomes the PRP time bar | Houston‑Sconiers overruled prior law (e.g., Brown) and required sentencing consideration of youth, so it is significant and material | Houston‑Sconiers may be significant but is limited (e.g., to life/effective life sentences) and not material here | Held: Houston‑Sconiers is a significant and material change; PRP timely under RCW 10.73.100(6) |
| Whether Houston‑Sconiers announced a new substantive constitutional rule requiring retroactive application | Yes — it establishes that certain adult SRA ranges/enhancements are categorically unavailable for juveniles with diminished culpability and requires discretion at sentencing | No — it is only a procedural rule requiring consideration of youth prospectively, not a substantive rule that invalidates past sentences | Held: Houston‑Sconiers announced a new substantive constitutional rule (with procedural components) and must be applied retroactively |
| Whether Ali showed actual and substantial prejudice from the sentencing error | Sentencing judge heard youth‑mitigation evidence but explicitly stated she lacked discretion to impose a sentence below the SRA; had discretion existed, she likely would have imposed less | Argues inadequate showing or that alternate remedies (e.g., Miller‑fix statute) provide relief | Held: Ali proved actual and substantial prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence; likely would have received a lower sentence but for the error |
| Whether statutory remedies (RCW 9.94A.730 “Miller‑fix”) make collateral relief unnecessary | Inadequate here because Houston‑Sconiers requires consideration and discretion at sentencing itself; the Miller‑fix would still require Ali to serve most of the imposed term before relief | Adequate remedy because it permits parole consideration after 20 years | Held: Miller‑fix was not an adequate remedy in these circumstances; resentencing ordered |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Houston‑Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 (2017) (held sentencing courts must consider mitigating qualities of youth and have discretion to impose sentences below SRA ranges/enhancements for juveniles)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment; youth must be considered)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule that must be applied retroactively)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (Eighth Amendment forbids life without parole for non‑homicide juvenile offenders)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Eighth Amendment forbids death penalty for juvenile offenders)
- State v. Brown, 139 Wn.2d 20 (1999) (pre‑Houston‑Sconiers precedent holding no discretion to impose downward departures for mandatory deadly‑weapon enhancements)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310 (2019) (addressed Houston‑Sconiers retroactivity; petitioner there failed to prove prejudice)
- State v. Scott, 190 Wn.2d 586 (2018) (upheld RCW 9.94A.730 as an adequate postconviction remedy for some Miller claims)