410 P.3d 1133
Wash.2018Background
- Eddie D. Arnold pleaded guilty in 1988 to second-degree statutory rape under former RCW 9A.44.080 (1979) for a 1987 offense.
- Washington later replaced the 1979 statutory-rape statutes with rape-of-a-child statutes and enacted the sex-offender registration law in 1990 (RCW 9A.44.130), which defines "sex offense" by reference to RCW 9.94A.030 (former subsection (46) (2012)).
- Former RCW 9.94A.030(46)(b) includes "any conviction for a felony offense in effect at any time prior to July 1, 1976, that is comparable to a felony classified as a sex offense in (a)." The question was whether Arnold’s 1979-amended statute satisfies that clause.
- Arnold was charged in 2013 with failure to register; he pleaded guilty in 2015 but moved to withdraw his plea after learning Division One’s Taylor decision had held similar 1979 statutory-rape convictions were outside the registration statute’s scope.
- The Court of Appeals, Division Three, reversed and followed Taylor and Wheeler under a newly articulated "horizontal stare decisis" principle; this Court granted review to resolve the statutory interpretation and the horizontal-stare-decisis issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Arnold) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arnold’s 1988 conviction counts as a "sex offense" triggering registration under former RCW 9.94A.030(46)(b) | The 1979 statute under which Arnold was convicted is not covered because it postdates 1976 and the statute uses present tense "is comparable," so only currently existing statutes count (per Taylor/Wheeler). | The conviction qualifies: the underlying offense traces to a pre-1976 formulation and is comparable to current chapter 9A.44 felonies, so it falls within (46)(b). | Court held Arnold’s conviction is a qualifying "sex offense" and he must register. |
| Whether a statute amended/recodified in 1979 nevertheless "was in effect prior to July 1, 1976" for (46)(b) | The State contended that the 1979 statute is materially identical to a 1975 statute, so the pre-1976 requirement is satisfied. | Arnold argued the relevant statutes were post-1976 and thus outside the (46)(b) backward-looking clause. | Court held the 1979 statute’s elements are identical to the pre-1976 statute, satisfying the temporal prerequisite. |
| Whether the prior statute is "comparable" to current chapter 9A.44 offenses | Arnold relied on Taylor/Wheeler readings that comparability requires a presently existing statute match. | The State argued comparability looks to elements: the 1979 conviction falls within current chapter 9A.44 definitions (rape/child-rape/child-molestation variants). | Court held comparability is met: no set of facts supporting the 1979 conviction would not also support a current chapter 9A.44 felony. |
| Whether Court of Appeals divisions are bound by other divisions ("horizontal stare decisis") | Division Three (lower court) and Arnold urged deference to Taylor/Wheeler; Arnold relied on that precedent when moving to withdraw his plea. | The State and the Supreme Court argued that panels of the Court of Appeals are persuasive but not binding on sister divisions; conflicts are for the Supreme Court to resolve. | Court rejected horizontal stare decisis between Court of Appeals divisions: other divisions’ opinions are persuasive only; this Court resolves conflicts. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Taylor, 162 Wn. App. 791 (2011) (Court of Appeals Division One holding that certain post-1976 statutory-rape convictions fell outside registration statute)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Wheeler, 188 Wn. App. 613 (2015) (Court of Appeals Division Two adopting similar reasoning to Taylor on comparability and registration)
- State v. Stockwell, 159 Wn.2d 394 (2007) (comparability analysis comparing prior statutory-rape statutes to current rape-of-child statutes)
- Grisby v. Herzog, 190 Wn. App. 786 (2015) (Court of Appeals discussion that decisions of other divisions are persuasive, not binding, and conflicts may warrant Supreme Court review)
- In re Personal Restraint of Thompson, 141 Wn.2d 712 (2000) (distinguishing ex post facto/element-difference issues when comparing prior and later statutes)