2019 CO 104
Colo.2019Background
- Rowell was charged in 18CR1611 (two class 4 felonies) in June 2018 and posted bond before the information was filed; he later was charged in 19CR15 (five felonies) in January 2019 and again posted bond.
- In February 2019 Rowell requested preliminary hearings; the district court granted a hearing on one count that required mandatory sentencing/was a crime of violence, but denied hearings on the remaining felony charges because Rowell was on bond and those charges were not subject to an automatic preliminary-hearing right under § 16-5-301(1)(b)(I).
- In May 2019 the court increased bonds; Rowell could not post the increased bonds in the older cases and was taken into custody on May 13 for 18CR1611 and 19CR15.
- Seventy-three days after his bonds were revoked (July 25), Rowell demanded preliminary hearings on the previously denied charges; the district court denied the demand, reasoning the right did not revive after a bond violation.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted C.A.R. 21 relief, held that a defendant taken into custody after bond revocation is eligible to demand a preliminary hearing under § 16-5-301(1)(b)(II), and remanded so the trial court can decide whether Rowell’s demand was made "within a reasonable time."
- The Court further held that Crim. P. 7(h)(1)’s seven-day deadline does not control situations where the defendant was ineligible during that seven-day window, and that Rule 7(h)(5) does not bar a new demand based on the changed circumstance of custody.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a defendant who previously posted bond can demand a preliminary hearing after bond is revoked and he is taken into custody | People: §16-5-301(1)(b)(II) should not be read to allow preliminary hearings except at the outset of prosecution; once right is lost while out on bond it does not revive | Rowell: When bonds are revoked and he is in custody, subsection (1)(b)(II) entitles him to demand a preliminary hearing | Court: A defendant taken into custody for the offense becomes eligible to demand a preliminary hearing under §16-5-301(1)(b)(II); district court erred by denying without assessing timeliness |
| Applicable deadline for demanding a preliminary hearing (Rule 7(h) seven-day rule vs. "within a reasonable time") | People: Crim. P. 7(h)(1) seven-day deadline (and Rule 7(h)(5) barring late/successive requests) controls and precludes Rowell’s late demand | Rowell: Seven-day rule inapplicable because he was ineligible during that period; a new custody-triggered demand is not successive | Court: Rule 7(h)(1) does not apply when defendant only becomes eligible after the seven-day period; Rule 7(h)(5) does not bar a custody-based demand; remand to determine whether Rowell’s demand (73 days after custody) was "within a reasonable time," with the seven-day rule usable as guidance |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Tafoya, 434 P.3d 1193 (Colo. 2019) (discussing C.A.R. 21 relief and mootness of preliminary-hearing claims post-trial)
- Hunter v. Dist. Court, 543 P.2d 1265 (Colo. 1975) (describing the purpose of a preliminary hearing as a probable-cause screening device)
- McCoy v. People, 442 P.3d 379 (Colo. 2019) (statutory interpretation principles)
- People in Interest of T.T., 442 P.3d 851 (Colo. 2019) (standards for extraordinary relief under C.A.R. 21)
- Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268 (Colo. 2005) (circumstances warranting exercise of original jurisdiction)
- Chavez-Torres v. People, 442 P.3d 843 (Colo. 2019) (de novo review of questions of law)