2020 CO 22
Colo.2020Background
- Paul Rosas was charged in Jan 2018 with multiple counts including second-degree assault on a peace officer and obstruction. He filed notice asserting an "impaired mental condition" defense (an outdated label now subsumed into statutory insanity).
- The district court allowed an impaired-mental-condition examination but mistakenly ordered a mental-condition (§ 16-8-107(3)(b)) exam rather than a statutory sanity exam (§ 16-8-106) and initially permitted Rosas to use his own expert, Dr. Westmoreland.
- Dr. Westmoreland intended to testify that Rosas’ mental disease (bipolar I with psychotic features, etc.) prevented him from forming the required intent (intentionally) for the felony counts.
- The People obtained a CMHIP examination by Dr. Remmert, who first performed a mental-condition exam and reported she could not opine on capacity to form mens rea because she was not ordered to do a sanity exam; after a supplemental exam she reported Rosas had a mental disease but could form mens rea.
- The People moved to (a) exclude evidence relevant to insanity or (b) compel Rosas to plead not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) and order a sanity exam. The district court denied those requests, prompting the People to seek original relief under C.A.R. 21.
- The Colorado Supreme Court held that evidence that a mental disease or defect prevented formation of the culpable mental state is evidence relevant to insanity and that section 16-8-107(3)(a) bars admitting such evidence unless the defendant enters an NGRI plea (no exception for specific-intent crimes); the court made the rule to show cause absolute and remanded to allow Rosas to plead NGRI or be precluded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence that a mental disease/defect prevented formation of the requisite culpable mental state is "evidence relevant to the issue of insanity." | Such evidence is relevant to insanity and therefore governed by insanity statutes. | The evidence is mental-condition evidence, not insanity evidence, and may be admitted without an NGRI plea. | Held: It is evidence relevant to insanity. |
| Whether a defendant charged with specific-intent crimes may introduce evidence that he lacked capacity to form mens rea without pleading NGRI. | Defendant must plead NGRI to introduce evidence relevant to insanity; no special rule for specific-intent crimes. | Rosas: specific-intent charge allows admission of expert mental-condition evidence on capacity without pleading NGRI. | Held: No exception for specific-intent crimes; NGRI plea required under § 16-8-107(3)(a). |
| Whether evidence of incapacity to form mens rea can be introduced via § 16-8-107(3)(b) mental-condition procedure (without NGRI). | § 16-8-107(3)(b) applies only to non-insanity mental-condition evidence; it does not permit admission of evidence that a defendant lacked capacity to form mens rea. | Rosas relied on § 16-8-107(3)(b) to justify the court-ordered mental-condition exam and admission without NGRI. | Held: § 16-8-107(3)(b) does not apply where the evidence is relevant to insanity; a sanity exam and NGRI plea are required. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Flippo, 159 P.3d 100 (Colo. 2007) (distinguishing insanity evidence from mental-condition evidence under § 16-8-107(3)(b))
- People v. Wilburn, 272 P.3d 1078 (Colo. 2012) (discussing § 16-8-107(3)(b) and mental-condition evidence used to negate mens rea)
- People v. Marko, 434 P.3d 618 (Colo. App. 2015) (recognizing that evidence a mental disease rendered defendant incapable of forming mens rea is insanity-related)
- People v. Sommers, 200 P.3d 1089 (Colo. App. 2008) (same)
- People v. Herrera, 87 P.3d 240 (Colo. App. 2003) (limiting admissibility of evidence from court-ordered exams to issues involving capacity to form mens rea when insanity is claimed)