In Re People v. Elmarr
2015 CO 53
| Colo. | 2015Background
- Victim Carol Murphy was found murdered in 1987; Kevin Elmarr was later charged and convicted of first‑degree murder (jury verdict 2009). On appeal the court of appeals reversed and remanded, concluding the trial court erred by excluding alternate‑suspect evidence related to Clifton St. Denis and Charles Murphy.
- St. Denis had been present near the scene, gave post‑incident statements to detectives confessing or saying he "coulda" done it, described crime scene details, had a history of strangulation and other violent incidents, and later recanted; St. Denis is deceased.
- At the first trial the trial court excluded all alternate‑suspect evidence (applying a ‘‘direct‑connection’’ approach to motive/opportunity evidence); Elmarr was nevertheless convicted and sentenced to life with parole eligibility after 40 years.
- The court of appeals held the excluded St. Denis evidence implicated identity and should have been evaluated under a ‘‘totality of the circumstances’’ relevancy test (People v. Muniz), reversing and remanding for a new trial.
- On remand the People moved to exclude similar‑acts evidence by St. Denis and his out‑of‑court statements; the trial court denied the People’s motion. The People petitioned the Colorado Supreme Court under C.A.R. 21 claiming the remand court applied the wrong admissibility framework.
- The Colorado Supreme Court held the remand court/trial court applied the incorrect analysis and set out the correct framework: admissibility depends on the strength of the non‑speculative nexus between the alternate suspect and the charged crime, guided by CRE 401, 403, 404(b), and applicable hearsay rules.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Elmarr’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper legal framework for alternate‑suspect evidence on remand | Trial court failed to apply correct CRE 401/403 and hearsay analysis; court of appeals’ Muniz approach was incorrect | Exclusion earlier violated Elmarr’s due process/right to present a defense; Muniz ‘‘totality’’ relevancy test applies | Court: admissibility depends on non‑speculative connection between alternate suspect and charged crime; use CRE 401/403 and, where relevant, CRE 404(b) principles — Muniz’s bifurcated test was incorrect |
| Admissibility of other similar acts by alternate suspect | Such acts must still show a non‑speculative nexus; trial court failed to reassess under correct standard | Other‑acts evidence (St. Denis’ strangulations) is probative of identity and should be admitted | Other‑acts evidence admissible only if, taken together, it supports finding the same person probably committed both acts (Flowers/Mulligan principles) |
| Admissibility of alternate suspect’s out‑of‑court statements/confessions | Statements must satisfy hearsay exceptions (e.g., CRE 804(b)(3)) and corroboration; trial court did not properly evaluate hearsay/trustworthiness | Statements corroborated by scene details and history; credibility for jury to resolve | Court: first determine hearsay admissibility (CRE 804(b)(3) or other exception); even if admissible, must still establish non‑speculative nexus with charged crime |
| Whether evidence may nevertheless be excluded on policy grounds | Even relevant evidence may be excluded under CRE 403 if confusion, misleading jury, or undue delay outweighs probative value | Admission necessary for meaningful opportunity to present defense; balancing should favor admission when probative | Court: perform CRE 403 balancing giving evidence maximum probative value and minimum unfair prejudice; trial court should reassess under this framework on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (criminal defendant’s right to present a meaningful defense limited by evidentiary rules preventing speculative alternate‑perpetrator theories)
- People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1982) (defense‑proffered other acts admissibility analyzed case‑by‑case; similar acts must collectively support finding same person probably committed both acts)
- People v. Mulligan, 568 P.2d 449 (Colo. 1977) (motive/opportunity alone insufficient; evidence must provide more to connect alternate suspect to crime)
- People v. Salazar, 272 P.3d 1067 (Colo. 2012) (apply general relevancy and CRE 404(b) principles to alternate‑suspect other‑acts evidence; exclude where not distinctive or probative)
- People v. Muniz, 190 P.3d 774 (Colo. App. 2008) (discussed and rejected here as creating a separate identity vs. motive/opportunity test)