2020 CO 25
Colo.2020Background
- DeGreat's convictions were reversed on appeal; the court of appeals issued its mandate returning jurisdiction on November 6, 2018.
- On December 3, 2018 the district court ordered counsel for both sides to contact chambers to set a status conference; the public defender entered appearance on December 6, 2018.
- Neither defense counsel, the prosecutor, nor the district court scheduled the status conference; no further action occurred for over six months.
- On June 4, 2019 (more than six months after the mandate) DeGreat moved to dismiss for violation of Colorado’s six-month retrial rule; the district court did not rule for over four months.
- On October 16, 2019 the district court denied the motion, concluding delay was attributable to both parties; DeGreat sought original relief under C.A.R. 21 in the Colorado Supreme Court.
- The Colorado Supreme Court held the delay was not chargeable to DeGreat, concluded the six-month statutory period was violated, and made the rule absolute dismissing the charges with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the post-mandate delay tolled under § 18-1-405(6)(f) because it was caused by the defendant | DeGreat’s counsel failed to comply with the scheduling order, so delay is at least partly attributable to DeGreat | A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; inaction by defense counsel is not affirmative consent to delay and the burden to pursue trial rests with the People and the court | Delay was not attributable to DeGreat; tolling provision does not apply; retrial deadline expired and charges must be dismissed with prejudice |
| Whether original relief under C.A.R. 21 was appropriate because the district court would be proceeding without jurisdiction if trial occurred after the statutory period | The People argued the trial court retained jurisdiction because delay was mutual | DeGreat argued the district court lost jurisdiction once the six-month statute ran and thus required extraordinary relief | C.A.R. 21 relief was appropriate; without it DeGreat would lack an adequate appellate remedy and the district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (a defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; State and its representatives must pursue timely prosecution)
- People v. Deason, 670 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1983) (six-month retrial rule requires dismissal when not met unless statutory exclusions apply)
- People v. Bell, 669 P.2d 1381 (Colo. 1983) (delay tolling requires defendant-caused delay via express consent or affirmative conduct)
- People v. Gallegos, 946 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1997) (six-month rule is mandatory; trial court has no discretion beyond statutory exclusions)
- Hills v. Westminster Mun. Court, 245 P.3d 947 (Colo. 2011) (burden to comply with speedy-trial limits rests with the prosecutor and the trial court)