In Re: Payne, J., III Appeal of: Com. of Pa
129 A.3d 546
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2015Background
- In 1986 John M. Payne III was convicted of second‑degree (felony) murder and related offenses for the 1981 killing of Elsie Rishel; conviction rested principally on three jailhouse/informant witnesses who testified Payne confessed; no physical evidence tied Payne to the scene at trial.
- Numerous items (hair, blood, clothing, linens, vacuum sweepings, broken window glass, telephone) were sent to the FBI in 1981–83 and preserved; some hairs were identified as non‑victim and not matched at that time.
- Payne filed a pro se motion for post‑conviction DNA testing under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1 in 2012 seeking testing of head hairs, a pubic hair, and multiple blood samples; he argued testing could either exclude him or identify another assailant (the “data bank” theory).
- The PCRA court granted testing, finding a reasonable possibility that exculpatory DNA (including identification of a different perpetrator from databanks) could establish Payne’s actual innocence; the Commonwealth appealed.
- The Superior Court (en banc) affirmed, holding that (1) absence of a defendant’s DNA alone generally will not establish actual innocence under § 9543.1, but (2) given the case facts and preserved evidence, testing could reasonably produce exculpatory results (e.g., identifying another person or matching a Commonwealth witness) capable of undermining the verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Payne’s Argument | Commonwealth’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 9543.1 permits DNA testing here because testing could produce exculpatory evidence establishing Payne’s "actual innocence" | Testing could either show absence of Payne’s DNA or identify another assailant via databanks, which—if exculpatory—would make it more likely than not no reasonable juror would convict | The jury convicted on accomplice/conspiracy theory; identification of another person would not negate Payne’s culpability as an accomplice; absence of Payne’s DNA alone is insufficient | Affirmed: court must assume exculpatory results; given case specifics (lack of physical corroboration, preserved non‑victim hairs), there is a reasonable possibility testing could produce evidence that would undermine the verdict and meet § 9543.1(d)(2) threshold |
| Does absence of a defendant’s DNA on tested items, by itself, satisfy § 9543.1(c)/(d)? | Absence could be exculpatory in context; Payne argued absence plus databank match theory | Absence alone cannot establish actual innocence because absence of DNA is often inconclusive | Held: absence alone is insufficient (citing Heilman, Smith, Brooks); additional contextual facts may be required; here absence alone would not suffice |
| Whether the overturned conspiracy conviction (or accomplice liability) precludes a finding that another person’s DNA could establish Payne’s innocence | Payne sought to challenge all convictions and argued identification of another could undermine credibility of confession witnesses and overall verdict | Commonwealth argued accomplice/conspiracy theory means another person’s presence would not exonerate Payne | Held: conspiracy conviction was reversed previously; even if it survived, presence of another’s DNA would not automatically preclude a finding of actual innocence—case‑specific analysis required; here identification of another (or a Commonwealth witness) could undercut the informant testimony and the verdict |
| Whether Payne’s petition was timely under § 9543.1(d)(1)(iii) (Edmiston) | Payne asserted recent receipt of FBI records in 2011 and filed in 2012; argued testing was therefore timely | Dissent argued Payne had received FBI materials during earlier PCRA litigation (1991–92) and waited >20 years, so petition was untimely and filed to delay | Held by majority: Commonwealth did not raise statutory timeliness below and thus waived the issue; majority declined to reach timeliness; a dissent would have denied testing as untimely under Edmiston |
Key Cases Cited
- Conway v. Commonwealth, 14 A.3d 101 (Pa. Super. 2011) (adopts a Schlup‑style approach to ‘‘actual innocence’’ in DNA motions and recognizes databank/redundancy/confession theories)
- Heilman v. Commonwealth, 867 A.2d 542 (Pa. Super. 2005) (absence of defendant’s DNA alone cannot establish actual innocence)
- Smith v. Commonwealth, 889 A.2d 582 (Pa. Super. 2005) (same—absence of DNA on a particular item was not meaningful where no basis existed to expect assailant DNA there)
- Brooks v. Commonwealth, 875 A.2d 1141 (Pa. Super. 2005) (denial of testing where no reasonable expectation that DNA results would exculpate)
- Edmiston v. Commonwealth, 65 A.3d 339 (Pa. 2013) (timeliness requirement under § 9543.1(d)(1)(iii); courts must assess whether DNA motions were timely and not merely dilatory)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (federal standard: new evidence must make it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; cited by state courts for defining “actual innocence” gateway)
- Williams v. Commonwealth, 35 A.3d 44 (Pa. Super. 2011) (procedural guidance that DNA motions under § 9543.1 are distinct from general PCRA timing bar)