In re Paul S. Haar, 270 A.3d 286

Background

Paul S. Haar, a solo immigration practitioner since 1983, routinely took modest flat fees; he had a prior 1997 thirty-day suspension for negligent misappropriation.
In 2009 this court in In re Mance clarified that flat fees are advances under Rule 1.15(e) and generally must be held in trust, stating that its ruling applied prospectively.
In 2008 Haar deposited a $5,500 flat fee from Ramiro Moya into his operating account (pre-Mance), later refunded the client from his IOLTA after a bar complaint in 2012.
In October 2012 Haar accepted a $10,000 flat fee from Yalcin Gur, deposited it in his operating account, used some funds, and ultimately refunded $8,000 after a complaint in late 2013.
The Hearing Committee found reckless/intentional misappropriation and recommended disbarment; the Board found no misconduct in the Moya matter and only negligence in the Gur matter, recommending a seven-month suspension plus one year probation with PMAS evaluation and CLE.
The court adopted the Board’s view: dismissed the Moya charge (no sanction) but held Haar negligent in the Gur matter and imposed the Board’s recommended sanction (seven-month suspension and one year probation with PMAS/CLE conditions).

Issues

Issue	Disciplinary Counsel’s Argument	Haar’s Argument	Held
Whether Haar’s handling of the Moya fee (received pre-Mance) violated Rule 1.15(e)	Moya fee was unearned and commingled; Mance requires flat fees be held in trust, so prior fees should have been moved into trust	Moya fee was received before Mance and many practitioners viewed such advances as attorney property; no duty to audit and move existing pre-Mance fees into trust	Court: No misconduct — Mance clarification applied prospectively and did not require retroactive auditing/transfer of pre-Mance flat fees
Whether Haar’s handling of the Gur fee (received post-Mance) rose to reckless or intentional misappropriation	Gur fee mishandled after Mance; facts support recklessness/intent and presumptive disbarment under Addams	Haar acted in good faith or, at most, negligently; he attended PMAS/CLE and changed practices for future matters; lacked evidence of conscious indifference	Court: Misappropriation proven but only negligent (not reckless/intentional); Disciplinary Counsel did not meet the clear-and-convincing burden for recklessness
Proper mental-state standard and burden for misappropriation cases	Recklessness/intent must be shown by clear and convincing evidence to exceed negligence and trigger harsher sanctions	Absent clear proof, burden not met; explanations and training mitigate culpability	Court: Affirms that state of mind must be proven clear and convincing; here evidence supports negligence only
Appropriate sanction for negligent misappropriation	Disciplinary Counsel sought disbarment for more culpable conduct	Haar sought lesser sanction; Board recommended seven-month suspension + probation with PMAS/CLE	Court: Adopts Board’s sanction: seven-month suspension and one-year probation with PMAS evaluation and up to ten hours CLE as recommended by PMAS

Key Cases Cited

In re Mance, 980 A.2d 1196 (D.C. 2009) (held flat fees are advances under Rule 1.15(e) and must be held in trust; ruling applied prospectively)
In re Haar, 698 A.2d 412 (D.C. 1997) (prior negligent misappropriation suspension of respondent)
In re Anderson, 778 A.2d 330 (D.C. 2001) (defines misappropriation and describes hallmarks of reckless misappropriation)
In re Addams, 579 A.2d 190 (D.C. 1990) (presumptive disbarment for misappropriation exceeding negligence)
In re Gray, 224 A.3d 1222 (D.C. 2020) (clarifies standards for misappropriation findings)
In re Edwards, 870 A.2d 90 (D.C. 2005) (identifies six-month suspension as a common sanction for negligent misappropriation)