in Re Patti J. Wagner, as Guardian of Jenny Wagner, an Incapacitated Adult
01-15-00774-CV
| Tex. App. | Apr 27, 2017Background
- Patti J. Wagner, as guardian for incapacitated adult Jenny Wagner, sued Four J’s Community Living Center and employee Anthonia Uduma alleging injuries arising from a fire started by resident Esperanza Arzola.
- At trial the jury answered “No” to whether Arzola’s negligence proximately caused Jenny’s injuries but found issues about criminal conduct (arson/recklessness) were for consideration under the charge.
- The trial judge (respondent) granted Four J’s and Uduma a new trial, stating the jury’s failure to find Arzola negligent was so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, citing Cropper v. Caterpillar.
- Wagner sought mandamus relief from the Court of Appeals to prevent the new trial; Justice Jennings wrote a concurring opinion explaining a separate ground to deny the trial court’s basis for a new trial.
- The concurring opinion explains that, given the charge definitions and the evidence (Arzola admitted setting the fire, said she “murdered her home,” and was upset), the jury could reasonably have concluded Arzola acted intentionally or recklessly, and therefore could rationally find no negligence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury’s negative finding on Arzola’s negligence is so against the great weight of the evidence that a new trial is required | Wagner: Evidence supported a finding that Arzola acted intentionally/recklessly, so the jury reasonably could find no negligence | Four J’s/Uduma: The evidence supports negligence; the jury’s “no” is against the great weight and warrants a new trial | Held: The jury could reasonably have found Arzola acted intentionally/recklessly; the negative negligence finding is not so against the great weight to justify a new trial |
| Whether an intentional act can be treated as negligence for recovery | Wagner: Intentional/reckless conduct is distinct from negligence and may preclude a negligence recovery | Four J’s/Uduma (and earlier appellate precedent): An intentional act may nevertheless constitute negligence | Held: Texas law recognizes a fundamental difference between intentional and negligent conduct; intentional conduct generally excludes negligence (earlier contrary statement in Dartez is erroneous) |
Key Cases Cited
- Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. 1988) (standard for granting new trial based on jury verdict being against the great weight of the evidence)
- Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2001) (factual-sufficiency review requires weighing all evidence supporting and contradicting the challenged finding)
- Plas–Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1989) (appellate review must examine all evidence supporting and contradicting jury findings)
- Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985) (recognizes fundamental difference between negligent and intentional injury; intent defined by Restatement)
- Fulmer v. Rider, 635 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1982) (where all evidence shows willful/intended act, plaintiff cannot recover on negligence theory)