In Re NICK H.
123 A.3d 229
| Md. Ct. Spec. App. | 2015Background
- Appellant Nick H., a juvenile at the time of his 2006 plea, pled involved to sexual-abuse and two counts of second-degree sexual offense involving a five-year-old victim.
- In 2009–2010, Maryland amended MSORA to require certain juveniles to register as sex offenders upon leaving the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, triggering a petition to place him on the registry.
- The juvenile court held a hearing in 2010 under the amended MSORA to determine whether appellant must register, based on clear and convincing evidence of significant risk of re-offending.
- The court, after weighing expert testimony and treatment records, found appellant at significant risk and placed him on the registry for five years, with prospect of later relief or modification.
- Appellant challenged (1) retroactive MSORA application under ex post facto norms and (2) the possibility of specific performance of his plea agreement; the court affirmed the registry order under the Mendoza-Martinez framework, concluding retroactive registration for juveniles is civil, not punitive.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does retroactive MSORA registration violate ex post facto provisions? | Krauser’s view cites Doe I as controlling, arguing retroactive registration is punitive. | State contends MSORA registration remains civil and regulatory, not punitive. | No ex post facto violation; registration is civil under the intent-effects framework. |
| Is retroactive MSORA registration permissible given Doe I’s reasoning? | Doe I suggests retroactive registration was punitive. | Doe I’s plurality is not controlling; the court adopts the intent-effects analysis. | Retroactive registration not punitive under the adopted test. |
| Is appellant entitled to specific performance of his plea agreement not to register? | Doe I suggested potential relief when registration was not contemplated in the plea. | Registration is a collateral consequence, not part of the sentence; cannot be enforced via plea terms. | No; registration is a collateral consequence and not enforceable by specific performance. |
Key Cases Cited
- Doe v. Dept. of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 430 Md. 535 (Md. 2013) (ex post facto retroactivity of MSORA as applied to Doe I; plurality opinion discusses disadvantage and intent-effects tests)
- Quispe del Pino v. Maryland Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services, 222 Md. App. 44 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (explains Doe I holding and Marks Rule application in Maryland court)
- Young v. State, 370 Md. 686 (Md. 2002) (establishes the intentional-effects framework for MSORA ex post facto analysis)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (U.S. 2003) (establishes two-step intent-effects test for civil-regulatory statutes vs. punishment)
- Demby v. Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 390 Md. 580 (Md. 2006) (reestablishes retroactivity analysis in ex post facto context)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 368 (U.S. 1963) (provides Mendoza-Martinez factors for punitive vs. civil sanctions)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (U.S. 1997) (discusses punitive vs. civil elements in regulation of conduct)
- Young v. State, 370 Md. 686 (Md. 2002) (cited for context on civil purpose of registration and deterrence)