In Re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659

Background

Foster parents (Christopher G. and Hope G.) filed to terminate Catherina M.’s parental rights to her daughter Neveah after DCS placed the child with them on June 29, 2015.
Mother had a long history of substance abuse, multiple positive drug screens in 2015–2016, homelessness, sporadic employment, and inconsistent visitation and financial support for Neveah.
The juvenile court awarded temporary custody to the foster parents and limited supervised visitation; mother failed to perfect an appeal.
At a multi-day circuit-court trial, the court found by clear and convincing evidence abandonment (failure to visit/support), and statutory ground Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14) (failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility plus risk of substantial harm), and terminated mother’s rights.
The Court of Appeals reversed, applying an interpretation that (under In re Ayden S.) required proof that a parent lacked both the ability and the willingness to assume custody/financial responsibility.
The Tennessee Supreme Court granted review limited to statutory construction, held the statute ambiguous, adopted the interpretation that proof of either inability or unwillingness suffices (overruling In re Ayden S.), found clear and convincing evidence under § 36-1-113(g)(14), and reinstated the trial court’s termination judgment.

Issues

Issue	Foster Parents’ Argument	Mother’s Argument	Held
Proper construction of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36‑1‑113(g)(14): whether the statute requires proof of both inability and unwillingness, or either one	Either inability or unwillingness to assume custody/financial responsibility satisfies the statute (aligning with In re Amynn K.)	The statute requires proof that the parent lacks both ability and willingness (In re Ayden S.)	Statute is ambiguous; legislative history and precedent support that proof of either inability or unwillingness satisfies the first prong; adopt the In re Amynn K. interpretation and overrule In re Ayden S.
Application of § 36‑1‑113(g)(14) to the facts: did foster parents prove the first prong by clear and convincing evidence?	Mother failed to manifest ability or willingness (homelessness, drug use, unstable finances, inconsistent visitation)	Mother had made improvements by trial (stable housing, employment, mental‑health care, some support/visitation)	Trial court’s factual findings were not preponderated against; clear and convincing evidence satisfied § 36‑1‑113(g)(14).
Risk of substantial harm (second prong of § 36‑1‑113(g)(14))	Placing Neveah with mother would risk physical/psychological harm given bonding to foster parents, mother’s relapse, and child’s needs (food allergies, stability)	Mother argued improved circumstances and bonding with younger sibling mitigate risk	Mother did not contest this point on appeal; record supports trial court’s uncontested finding of substantial risk; second prong satisfied.
Best‑interests determination	Termination is in Neveah’s best interests (child bonded to foster parents; stability; visitation problems; support issues)	Mother urged that reunification and recent improvements favored keeping parental rights	Trial court properly applied statutory best‑interest factors; termination found to be in child’s best interests; Supreme Court affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507 (Tenn. 2016) (standard of appellate review in parental termination appeals)
In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586 (Tenn. 2010) (analysis of similar statutory language re: ability and willingness)
In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240 (Tenn. 2010) (separation of grounds and best‑interests analyses)
In re Gabriella D., 531 S.W.3d 662 (Tenn. 2017) (guidance on best‑interests factors)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (due‑process principles and heightened proof requirement in parental‑rights terminations)
State v. Frazier, 558 S.W.3d 145 (Tenn. 2018) (rules of statutory construction)