In Re Nevaeh B. - Dissent, W2016-01769-COA-R3-PT

Appeal arises from a termination of parental rights case; the Court of Appeals majority dismissed the mother's appeal because she did not sign the notice of appeal, citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d).
Judge Frank G. Clement Jr. filed a dissent arguing the signature requirement is not jurisdictional and dismissal without an opportunity to cure is not compelled by the statute.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) (effective July 1, 2016) states: any notice of appeal in a termination-of-parental-rights action shall be signed by the appellant.
The dissent contends the statute is clear and unambiguous but does not prescribe dismissal or declare the signature requirement jurisdictional.
The dissent distinguishes prior appellate decisions and out-of-state authorities relied upon by the majority, noting those authorities rely on statutes or rules that expressly mandate dismissal or require signatures in appellate rules.
The dissent observes Tennessee appellate rules (including Tenn. R. App. P. 3(f) and Rule 8A) do not require a signature on the notice of appeal and that existing forms and comments do not reflect § 36-1-124(d), creating potential confusion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-124(d) is jurisdictional	Mother: signature requirement is mandatory but does not strip appellate jurisdiction	State/Majority: absence of appellant's signature deprives court of jurisdiction over appeal	Dissent: statute is not jurisdictional; failure to sign does not automatically divest jurisdiction
Whether the statute requires automatic dismissal when the notice lacks appellant’s signature	Mother: statute does not state dismissal is required; courts may allow cure	Majority: dismissal required for noncompliance	Dissent: statute does not compel automatic dismissal; courts may afford opportunity to cure
Whether out-of-state authorities compel dismissal in Tennessee	Mother: out-of-state statutes/rules differ (some expressly require dismissal or include signature rules) and are distinguishable	Majority: relied on cases from other states to support dismissal rule	Dissent: out-of-state precedents are inapposite because their statutes/rules include explicit dismissal or different procedural schemes
Whether Tennessee’s Appellate Rules require signatures or incorporate § 36-1-124(d)	Mother: Tenn. R. App. P. do not require signatures and do not incorporate the statute; forms are silent	Majority: treated § 36-1-124(d) as controlling for termination appeals	Dissent: Rules and forms do not require signatures; lack of rule-level incorporation supports allowing cure rather than dismissal

Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503 (Tenn. 2004) (apply plain statutory meaning when text is unambiguous)
Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515 (Tenn. 2010) (give effect to every word used in a statute)
State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2007) (presume legislature used each word deliberately)
Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594 (Tenn. 2012) (courts will not read language into a statute that the legislature did not include)
Moody v. State, 160 S.W.3d 512 (Tenn. 2005) (purpose of appellate rules is to consolidate procedural law and provide clarity)