In re N.M. CA1/2, A148099

Background

N.M., a 17-year-old immigrant youth, pled no contest to first-degree residential burglary (violent felony) for entering a home while occupants were present; vehicle theft charge was dismissed.
Burglary occurred on Dec. 24, 2015; items and cash (~$950) were taken though most property was later recovered; no forced entry or physical injury.
N.M. had prior admission to a recent vehicle theft/vandalism, marijuana use, poor school attendance/grades, disciplinary incidents, and was under influence at time of burglary.
Probation assessed him as low risk of reoffending but nonetheless recommended out-of-home placement (9 months) for structured intervention (substance abuse and cognitive programming); family circumstances included crowded low-income housing and limited supervision.
Juvenile court adjudged N.M. a ward, found removal justified under Welf. & Inst. Code §726, and committed him to Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility for one year with 90 days conditional release.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering out-of-home commitment instead of home probation	Court has broad discretion to impose custodial placements for rehabilitation and public protection	N.M. argued commitment was unnecessary given remorse, family support, and low reoffense risk; urged supervised probation with stayed commitment	No abuse of discretion; commitment affirmed due to gravity of offense, prior conduct, substance use, school problems, and need for structured treatment
Whether removal from family custody requires a "compelling necessity" (substantive due process)	N.M. argued constitutional right to remain with family requires compelling necessity before out-of-home placement	State argued no such heightened standard was asserted below and statutes allow juvenile-court discretion; issue forfeited	Forfeited because not raised below; alternatively, rejected on merits—no authority requires a "compelling necessity" showing beyond statutory discretion
Whether disposition was motivated by religious or national-origin animus	— (People/respondent did not concede animus)	N.M. claimed discriminatory animus based on comments and treatment	Rejected: record showed respectful conduct, an interpreter was provided, and isolated references in probation report do not prove judicial or prosecutorial discrimination
Whether the court improperly considered dismissed vehicle-theft conduct (Harvey issue)	People relied on juvenile's admission/record of prior auto theft as relevant background	N.M. argued dismissal barred consideration without Harvey waiver	Harvey (criminal) does not apply to juvenile proceedings; court could consider prior conduct

Key Cases Cited

In re Eddie M., 31 Cal.4th 480 (2003) (juvenile court has broad discretion to select custodial or noncustodial dispositions)
In re Khamphouy S., 12 Cal.App.4th 1130 (1993) (affirming commitment of 17‑year‑old to ranch facility for weapons/probation violations)
In re Robert H., 96 Cal.App.4th 1317 (2002) (upholding out‑of‑home placement over home supervision given seriousness of offense)
In re Nicole H., 244 Cal.App.4th 1150 (2016) (no abuse of discretion removing juvenile despite low risk where violent offense and need for structured treatment)
In re James R., 153 Cal.App.4th 413 (2007) (recognizes juvenile’s visitation rights when placed outside home and emphasizes flexibility of juvenile delinquency statutes)
In re M.H., 1 Cal.App.5th 699 (2016) (forfeiture principles where an argument not raised below cannot be considered on appeal)
People v. Harvey, 25 Cal.3d 754 (1979) (criminal‑procedure rule on use of dismissed counts in sentencing; court held not applicable to juvenile proceedings)
In re Jimmy P., 50 Cal.App.4th 1679 (1996) (discusses inapplicability of Harvey in juvenile context)
In re Ryan B., 216 Cal.App.3d 1519 (1989) (procedural safeguards regarding custody at arraignment)
In re Daniel M., 47 Cal.App.4th 1151 (1996) (same)
In re L.M., 177 Cal.App.4th 645 (2009) (juvenile’s visitation right does not impose a state duty to fund travel costs)