In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365

Morgan seeks authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A).
He asserts a Miller v. Alabama claim: as a juvenile offender who received mandatory life without parole, his Eighth Amendment rights were violated.
Morgan argues Miller creates a new retroactive rule applicable on collateral review, citing In re Moss as supporting retroactivity for related lines of precedent.
The district court and Eleventh Circuit must determine whether the Miller rule is retroactive and whether Morgan excuses procedural requirements for filing a second or successive motion.
The court analyzes whether Miller is a substantive vs. procedural change and whether it prohibits a category of punishment; it ultimately denies authorization.
Concurrence notes Miller may have both procedural and substantive components, but remains non-retroactive under current law.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is Miller retroactive to collateral review?	Morgan relies on Moss to claim retroactivity.	Morgan contends Miller should be retroactive as a substantive rule.	Miller not retroactive.
Does Miller create a new rule of constitutional law applicable on collateral review?	Rule expands sentencing options for juveniles.	Rule is procedural and not retroactive.	Not retroactive; Miller not a retroactive new rule.
May Morgan obtain authorization for a second § 2255 motion under Moss/Tyler framing?	Miller would justify prima facie showing of retroactivity under Moss.	Miller does not fit retroactivity framework to permit second or successive motion.	Application denied.

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Eighth Amendment bans mandatory life without parole for juveniles; rule not retroactive here)
In re Moss, 703 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2013) (retroactivity for new rule prohibiting category of punishment)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juvenile life without parole for non-homicide offenses unconstitutional)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty for juveniles unconstitutional)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (new rules generally not retroactive on collateral review)
Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656 (2001) (retroactivity framework for new rules on collateral review)
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (procedural retroactivity concept; categorization of rules)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (new rules are procedural if they regulate the manner of determining culpability)
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (mitigating factors must be considered in sentencing)
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (unconstitutional mandatory death sentence statutes)
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (see above (duplicate listing for emphasis))
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (capital punishment considerations; evolving Eighth Amendment interpretations)