In re: Michael Morgan
717 F.3d 1186
11th Cir.2013Background
- Morgan was convicted in 1993 of racketeering offenses and the Tillman murder underlying his life-without-parole sentence.
- Morgan sought post-conviction relief multiple times (2004 Crawford challenge; 2006 COA; 2009 unauthorized motion; 2011 third motion with Apprendi, Graham claims).
- Morgan’s 2012 Miller v. Alabama argument asserted retroactive relief based on Miller’s rule prohibiting mandatory life without parole for juveniles.
- Panel held Miller’s rule is not retroactive on collateral review under Teague’s framework; Miller is procedural, not substantive.
- Morgan’s request to file a fourth, successive § 2255 motion hinged on whether Miller constitutes a retroactive new rule; the court denied en banc review finding no exceptional issue to revisit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Miller is a retroactive new rule under Teague. | Morgan argues Miller is a substantive, retroactive rule. | United States argues Miller is procedural and not retroactive. | Miller is procedural; not retroactive on collateral review. |
| Whether Teague’s substantive/procedural distinction governs Miller’s retroactivity. | Morgan contends Miller changes substantive sentencing norms. | U.S. maintains Teague’s framework controls and Miller is not retroactive. | Substantive/procedural Teague distinction governs retroactivity; Miller not retroactive. |
| Whether en banc review is warranted given the exceptional importance of Miller retroactivity. | Morgan argues the question is of exceptional importance. | Panel decision is correct and en banc review would be wasteful. | En banc review denied; issue deemed not exceptional enough to warrant rehearing. |
| Whether federal retroactivity decisions should differ from state retroactivity decisions in this context. | Morgan notes variable state approaches to Miller retroactivity. | Federal law governs collateral relief; Teague applies to federal review. | Federal retroactivity analysis governs; state decisions are not controlling. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012) (prohibits mandatory life without parole for juveniles; discussed as procedural rule for Teague)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (establishes substantive vs. procedural Teague exceptions)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (U.S. 2004) (distinguishes procedural rules from substantive for retroactivity)
- In re Moss, 703 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2013) (limits retroactivity to certain new rules under AEDPA)
- Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (U.S. 1989) (defines substantive rule by prohibiting certain punishments for a class)