241 A.3d 309
D.C.2020Background
- Michael A. Wilson, an attorney and physician, represented the decedent's husband (Fields) and three children in a potential wrongful-death action but did not explain or obtain informed-consent for joint representation.
- Wilson drafted a handwritten distribution statement reflecting Fields’s requested equal division; only Fields signed. Probate counsel later told Fields the document was not binding; Fields then sought a 50% share. Wilson did not inform the children of these developments.
- Fields directed Wilson not to communicate with one child; Wilson complied but did not withdraw from representing the children.
- Wilson filed the wrongful-death suit without consulting the children, later obtained a reasonable settlement, and negotiated a post-settlement division (Fields 37.5%; children 62.5%) after children objected.
- At the disciplinary hearing, the Hearing Committee found Wilson gave intentionally false testimony about advising clients that the handwritten document was invalid. The Board found violations of D.C. Rules 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.4, and 1.7.
- The Board recommended a 30-day suspension (not stayed), citing false testimony as a significant aggravating factor; Wilson conceded the rule violations but asked for the suspension to be stayed in favor of probation. The court adopted the 30‑day suspension, to begin within 90 days at Wilson’s chosen date, conditioned on filing the required affidavit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appropriate sanction: whether suspension should be stayed in favor of probation | Wilson: stay suspension; probation adequate given mitigating circumstances | Board: suspension appropriate; intentionally false testimony is a significant aggravator | Court: adopted 30‑day suspension (not stayed); timing flexibility within 90 days contingent on affidavit |
| Whether Board applied a categorical rule barring stays for false testimony | Wilson: Board treated false testimony as an automatic bar to a stay | Board: it did not adopt a categorical rule; deemed false testimony a significant aggravating factor | Court: agreed Board did not adopt a categorical rule; false testimony remains a major aggravator |
| Consistency with precedent and hardship on solo practice | Wilson: decision conflicts with prior cases (Clennon, Spaulding) and negotiated dispositions; suspension unduly harms clients given solo practice | Board: prior cases were not contested or didn’t involve false testimony; negotiated dispositions not binding; timing flexibility mitigates client harm | Court: sanction falls within wide range of acceptable outcomes; precedent distinguished; timing flexibility acceptable |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Fay, 111 A.3d 1025 (D.C. 2015) (sanctions serve public interest and deter misconduct)
- In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 892 A.2d 396 (D.C. 2006) (false testimony to disciplinary body is highly aggravating)
- In re Chapman, 962 A.2d 922 (D.C. 2009) (deliberately false testimony heavily informs sanctioning)
- In re Clennon, 182 A.3d 121 (D.C. 2018) (discussion of stayed suspension in uncontested review)
- In re Spaulding, 635 A.2d 343 (D.C. 1993) (example of stayed suspension in prior discipline)
- In re Schwartz, 221 A.3d 925 (D.C. 2019) (ultimate choice of sanction is for the court)
- In re Avery, 189 A.3d 715 (D.C. 2018) (allowing respondent to select suspension start date to reduce client disruption)
- In re Robbins, 192 A.3d 558 (D.C. 2018) (conflict-of-interest violations can warrant 60‑day suspensions and longer)