In re McGraw, 414 P.3d 841

Background

Scott W. McGraw was appointed conservator for Carol Saslow after her 2010 stroke; her husband Michael initially served but had financial mismanagement issues.
McGraw charged differing hourly rates for attorney work and fiduciary work but billed the conservatorship at the higher attorney rate for fiduciary tasks and for litigation aimed at Michael.
McGraw pursued aggressive actions: sought to liquidate ranch assets, filed to become Michael’s conservator, sought to eject Michael from the ranch and repossess a van, and sent letters to friends, family, and creditors urging them to oppose Michael and press claims.
The probate court repeatedly limited McGraw’s enforcement authority, reduced his fee requests, and criticized his conduct as driven by animosity toward Michael.
The Oregon State Bar charged McGraw with violations of RPC 1.5(a), 3.1, 4.4(a), and 8.4(a)(4); a disciplinary panel found multiple violations and recommended an 18-month suspension.
The Oregon Supreme Court (de novo review) found violations of RPC 1.5(a), 4.4(a), and 8.4(a)(4), but not proven violations of RPC 3.1; it imposed an 18‑month suspension (commencing 60 days after the decision).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Bar)	Defendant's Argument (McGraw)	Held
Did McGraw charge clearly excessive fees in violation of RPC 1.5(a)?	He billed fiduciary time and time not advancing the ward’s interests at attorney rates and billed the estate for litigation targeting Michael.	Fees were submitted for court approval under ORS 125.095; court approval forecloses a Bar violation.	Held: Yes. Charging attorney rates for fiduciary work and billing the estate for matters not advancing the ward violated RPC 1.5(a).
Did McGraw knowingly advance frivolous positions in violation of RPC 3.1?	He pursued meritless claims: holding Michael personally liable, pushing for criminal charges without basis, and seeking to be Michael’s conservator without grounds.	He had plausible legal bases and/or factual support for each effort; motivations irrelevant to frivolousness.	Held: No. Bar failed to prove violations under RPC 3.1; positions were at least plausible.
Did McGraw use means to harass or burden Michael in violation of RPC 4.4(a)?	Letters to family, friends, and creditors served only to harass, burden, and impede administration of the estate.	He had fiduciary duties (accounting, informing creditors) and duties to disclose concerns about Michael’s conduct.	Held: Yes. The court found the letters (especially post‑death creditor letters) had no substantial purpose other than to harass/burden Michael and violated RPC 4.4(a).
Did McGraw engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice under RPC 8.4(a)(4)?	His excessive billing, abusive enforcement, litigation tactics, and disparaging letters undermined court processes and consumed judicial resources.	Some actions were statutorily or court‑approved remedies; not all conduct was improper.	Held: Yes. Court found charging excessive fees, harassing letters, and other tactics prejudiced the administration of justice; violation proven.

Key Cases Cited

In re Potts/Trammel/Hannon, 301 Or. 57 (probate court approval of fees is not conclusive against a disciplinary finding for excessive fees)
In re Stauffer, 327 Or. 44 (disciplinary violation for excessive fees despite prior probate review)
In re Marandas, 351 Or. 521 (a legal position is not frivolous if it is plausible)
In re Obert, 352 Or. 231 (definition and standard for frivolous positions under RPC 3.1)
In re Leuenberger, 337 Or. 183 (motivation irrelevant to frivolousness analysis)
In re Paulson, 341 Or. 13 (suspension for conduct prejudicial to administration of justice)
In re Kluge, 335 Or. 326 (standards for proving RPC 8.4(a)(4) violations)
In re Meyer, 328 Or. 211 (administration-of-justice concept includes procedure and parties’ substantive interests)
In re Rhodes, 331 Or. 231 (two-year suspension for contempt, misrepresentations, and prejudicial conduct)
In re Skagen, 342 Or. 183 (one-year suspension for misconduct across matters including conduct prejudicial to administration of justice)