In re Maurer, 431 P.3d 410

Background

Steven L. Maurer, a retired Clackamas County circuit judge, presided over a contentious 2007–2008 marital dissolution that resulted in a judgment and parenting plan; he later issued modification orders in 2011.
Maurer retired in 2013 and entered private practice. In 2014 another judge (Judge Anderly) issued a visitation-related order addressing the child’s alleged allergy reactions during the other parent’s visits.
In 2015 the mother (pro se) moved for contempt against the father for allegedly violating the 2014 order and sought modification-type relief; the father retained Maurer to represent him in that contempt proceeding.
Maurer did not disclose to the mother that he had been the judge in the original dissolution and did not obtain the mother’s informed written consent as required by RPC 1.12(a).
The Disciplinary Board trial panel found Maurer did not violate RPC 1.12(a) or RPC 8.4(a)(4), but the Oregon Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo.
The court held that Maurer violated RPC 1.12(a) because the contempt proceeding was “in connection with” the earlier dissolution (it arose from a modification and involved the same parties and visitation conditions), but did not violate RPC 8.4(a)(4); the court imposed a 30‑day suspension.

Issues

Issue	Bar's Argument	Maurer’s Argument	Held
Whether representing the father in the contempt proceeding violated RPC 1.12(a) (former judge may not represent in a matter he personally and substantially participated in absent written consent)	The contempt hearing was the same matter (or substantially related) to the dissolution because it involved the same parties, case number, overlapping factual/legal issues, and arose from authority in the dissolution judgment	The contempt proceeding was a distinct matter under different statutes, addressing new facts (allergies), and thus was not the same matter requiring consent	Held: Violation of RPC 1.12(a). The contempt arose from a modification of the dissolution, involved same parties and visitation conditions, and was therefore “in connection with” the earlier matter
Whether Maurer’s conduct violated RPC 8.4(a)(4) (conduct prejudicial to administration of justice)	Former judge’s presence could unduly influence the court and injured the pro se mother (she became distressed), causing substantial harm to administration of justice	No substantial actual or potential harm occurred; judge was not swayed and harm to mother, while real, was not substantial	Held: No violation of RPC 8.4(a)(4). Potential and actual harms were not shown to be substantial
Appropriate sanction	Suspension (Bar sought 30 days)	Mitigating factors and plausible legal position warrant limited sanction	Held: 30‑day suspension, commencing 60 days after filing (conflicts violation typically justifies 30 days; mitigating and aggravating factors balanced)

Key Cases Cited

In re Lawrence, 350 Or. 480 (discusses standards for proving RPC 8.4(a)(4) prejudice)
In re Webb, 363 Or. 42 (ABA Standards framework for sanctions)
In re Hostetter, 348 Or. 574 (conflict violations often justify 30‑day suspension)
In re Campbell, 345 Or. 670 (conflict violations and sanction guidance)
In re Hockett, 303 Or. 150 (conflicts rule sanction precedent)
In re Sanai, 360 Or. 497 (case‑matching caution in disciplinary proceedings)
In re McGraw, 362 Or. 667 (when refusal to acknowledge wrongful conduct can be aggravating)
In re Davenport, 334 Or. 298 (defense rights vs. aggravation analysis)
In re Strickland, 339 Or. 595 (refusal to acknowledge wrongful conduct as aggravating when unreasonable)