315 A.3d 446
Del.2024Background
- This appeal concerns a stockholder lawsuit challenging the fairness of IAC/InterActiveCorp's (IAC) separation from its controlled subsidiary, Match Group, Inc., via a reverse spinoff.
- Plaintiffs alleged IAC, as a controlling stockholder, secured benefits for itself in the transaction at the expense of Match's minority stockholders.
- The Court of Chancery dismissed the complaint, applying business judgment review because the transaction utilized both a special committee and a minority stockholder vote in accordance with the MFW framework.
- The plaintiffs appealed, challenging whether the MFW framework was properly applied and if the business judgment standard was appropriate given concerns over committee independence.
- The Supreme Court reversed in part, finding the special committee lacked independence and remanded for further proceedings under the entire fairness standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appropriate Standard of Review in Controlling Stockholder Transaction | Entire fairness should apply unless all requirements of MFW (independent committee and minority vote) are met. | Business judgment should apply if either a special committee or minority vote is employed (not both), especially outside freeze-out mergers. | Entire fairness is presumptive unless all MFW requirements are met, even outside freeze-out mergers. |
| MFW Committee Independence Requirement | Every director on the special committee must be independent for MFW to apply; McInerney was conflicted and dominated negotiations. | Only a majority of the committee need be independent; any conflicts were immaterial and did not dominate the process. | All committee members must be independent for MFW to shift to business judgment review; here, McInerney's lack of independence was sufficient to retain entire fairness review. |
| Adequacy of Proxy Disclosures | Material information about McInerney's conflicts was not adequately disclosed to minority stockholders, making the vote uninformed. | All material information about McInerney’s affiliation was publicly disclosed or incorporated by reference; any omitted facts were immaterial. | On remand, the sufficiency of disclosures may be reconsidered in light of committee independence findings. |
| Derivative Standing Post-Merger | Separation was a mere reorganization, preserving right to bring derivative claims as ownership interest remained effectively the same. | Separation fundamentally changed ownership and corporate structure (not a mere reorganization), terminating standing for derivative claims. | The transaction was not a mere reorganization; no derivative standing for plaintiffs post-merger. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (sets the conditions for business judgment review to apply in controlling stockholder transactions—the MFW framework)
- Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (entire fairness is default review for controlling stockholder transactions, burden may shift if procedural protections used)
- Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (entire fairness standard includes fair dealing and fair price analysis in conflicted transactions)
- Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995) (explains burden shifting in entire fairness review)
- Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (self-dealing by controlling stockholder requires entire fairness review)
- Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (directors’ fiduciary duties to corporation and stockholders)
- Central Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Holdings LLC, 27 A.3d 531 (Del. 2011) (motion to dismiss standard in Delaware)
- Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) (sets business judgment rule and circumstances for its rebuttal)
- Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (clarifies standard for director’s decision-making and good faith)
- Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019) (longstanding personal/business ties may undermine director independence)
- Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996) (business judgment review can apply if benefits are proportionate to all stockholders)
