2019 IL App (2d) 180011
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- Lisa and Scott Solano signed a premarital agreement (Dec. 9, 2000) that included mutual disclosure schedules and an express written waiver: the parties agreed the attached Exhibits were adequate disclosures and waived any right to further disclosure. They married Dec. 31, 2000.
- Exhibit A and Exhibit B attached to the agreement listed "None" in the space for assets; Exhibit C identified certain family business interests as Lisa’s separate "Family Business Property."
- In July 2017 Lisa filed for dissolution and sought a declaratory judgment that the premarital agreement was enforceable; Scott contended it was unenforceable for lack of disclosure, involuntariness, and unconscionability.
- Scott sought a continuance to conduct discovery about Lisa’s assets, family business interests, and the circumstances of negotiation/execution; the trial court limited discovery and proceeded first to decide voluntariness of Scott’s written waiver under section 7(a)(2)(ii) of the Illinois Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.
- At hearing Scott testified (with some testimony excluded) that he did not understand the waiver and that Lisa had not disclosed assets; the trial court found Scott voluntarily waived further disclosure and entered judgment enforcing the agreement. Scott appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lisa) | Defendant's Argument (Scott) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial court abused discretion by denying continuance/discovery | Court could limit initial discovery to dispositive voluntariness issue; waiver language is dispositive so broad discovery unnecessary | Denial prevented discovery into Lisa’s actual financial disclosures and assets that bear on voluntariness of the waiver | Affirmed — court may limit discovery to dispositive issues; Scott showed no prejudice because voluntariness of waiver does not depend on whether other party made disclosures |
| Whether hearing was unfair (evidence exclusions, refusing adverse-witness exam) | Excluding testimony about pre-signing disclosures was proper because voluntariness of waiver was the controlling issue | Exclusions and pre-judgment comments deprived him of a full, fair hearing | Affirmed — exclusions were consistent with focusing on voluntariness under §7(a)(2)(ii); no demonstrated prejudice; many objections forfeited for inadequate appellate argument |
| Interpretation of §7(a)(2)(ii): can a waiver be voluntary if other party made no or inadequate disclosure? | Waiver language in the agreement (and statute) relieves obligation of further disclosure; a written, voluntary waiver is effective even if nothing was disclosed | Waiver cannot be voluntary if the other party failed to make a fair and reasonable disclosure or challenger lacked knowledge of assets; thus discovery on actual assets was required | Affirmed — court reads §7(a)(2)(ii) to allow a voluntary written waiver independent of adequacy of prior disclosure; waiver can be effective even where no assets were disclosed |
Key Cases Cited
- J.S.A. v. M.H., 224 Ill. 2d 182 (Ill. 2007) (trial court’s inherent authority to control litigation procedure and discovery)
- Yuretich v. Sole, 259 Ill. App. 3d 311 (Ill. App. Ct.) (trial court may limit initial discovery to dispositive issues)
- Gunn v. Sobucki, 216 Ill. 2d 602 (Ill. 2005) (questions of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Bank of New York Mellon v. Laskowski, 2018 IL 121995 (Ill. 2018) (statutory interpretation principles; plain meaning governs)
- Davis v. Miller, 7 P.3d 1223 (Kan. 2000) (discusses disclosure adequacy and waiver language under a Uniform Act adoption)
- Friezo v. Friezo, 914 A.2d 533 (Conn. 2007) (addressing disclosure and waiver under Connecticut’s version of the Uniform Act)
- In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000) (factors relevant to voluntariness of signing premarital agreements under California’s adoption of the Uniform Act)