In re Marriage of Roman-Kroczek, 2021 IL App (1st) 210613

Krystyna filed for dissolution in 2012; the matter has been pending for nine years with multiple trials and remands.
Bohdan and Krystyna bought a Florida home in 2006; Izabela (Krystyna’s sister) loaned $350,000 toward the down payment and later claimed at least $214,643.75 owed for that loan and additional sums for living and litigation expenses.
At the 2015 trial the court initially awarded the Florida property to Izabela; relying on that judgment she paid off the mortgage and moved in. This judgment was reversed on appeal because the trial court had improperly sanctioned Bohdan, and the matter returned for further proceedings.
On remand the circuit court ordered Izabela to obtain a $275,000 line of credit (no lender complied) and, on April 27, 2021, entered an order compelling Izabela to list and sell the Florida property and place proceeds into escrow to pay interim attorney fees.
Izabela appealed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307; the appellate court held the trial court’s sale order was an injunction but reversed it as an abuse of discretion because it was not narrowly tailored, unnecessary given available remedies, and posed disproportionate harm to Izabela (secured lien, mortgage payoff, homestead and trustee complications).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Appealability: is the order a reviewable injunction?	Bohdan: order is routine interim relief, not an injunction.	Izabela: order compels affirmative acts (sell property), so is an injunction under Rule 307.	Court: Order is a mandatory injunction appealable under Rule 307.
Whether trial court properly compelled sale of Florida property to pay interim fees	Bohdan: Florida home is marital asset after reversal; sale is within court’s discretion to fund litigation.	Izabela: sale is unnecessary, overbroad, and prejudices her secured interests.	Court: Ordering sale was an abuse of discretion.
Necessity and narrow tailoring of injunction	Bohdan: attorneys need payment; access to marital assets justified.	Izabela: other assets exist, property held in trust, and attorneys can be paid after final adjudication.	Court: injunction not narrowly tailored, no showing of necessity or absence of adequate legal remedy.
Consideration of third‑party rights and secured interests	Bohdan: focused on funding litigation; did not address third‑party claims.	Izabela: recorded lien, mortgage payoff, homestead exemption, trustee not before court—order undermines secured rights and third‑party protections.	Court: trial court failed to account for lien, equity ownership, trustee and homestead issues; order risks irreparable harm to Izabela.

In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247 (1989) (defines an injunction as a judicial process requiring a person to do or refrain from doing a particular thing)
In re Estate of Yucis, 382 Ill. App. 3d 1062 (2008) (order compelling sale of property constitutes an injunction appealable under Rule 307)
Tsuetaki v. Novicky, 158 Ill. App. 3d 505 (1983) (injunctions must be reasonable and narrowly tailored)
Kaplan v. Kaplan, 98 Ill. App. 3d 136 (1981) (adequate remedy at law may defeat need for injunctive relief)
Allstate Amusement Co. of Illinois, Inc. v. Pasinato, 96 Ill. App. 3d 306 (1981) (availability of alternative remedies is relevant to injunctive relief)
Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 186 Ill. 2d 198 (1999) (urgency and necessity required to justify extraordinary equitable relief)
In re Marriage of Walsh, 109 Ill. App. 3d 171 (1982) (court may not order payment of attorney fees directly from marital estate)
In re Marriage of Olbrecht, 232 Ill. App. 3d 358 (1992) (injunctions must consider and protect third‑party interests)