2020 IL App (3d) 190688
Ill. App. Ct.2020Background
- Jill and Lance Prusak divorced in 2012; they share three children. A 2016 modification gave the parties essentially equal time after M.P. moved to Lance.
- In March 2019 Jill petitioned to relocate the two younger children from Naperville, IL to Evansville, IN, claiming a remote full‑time job and lower housing costs; she moved to Evansville in June 2019 without the children.
- At the July 2019 relocation hearing the guardian ad litem (GAL) recommended allowing the move; Jill emphasized financial and family‑support reasons and the ability to work remotely; Lance (high earner) emphasized travel burdens, disruption to extracurriculars/friends, and supervision concerns.
- The circuit court denied relocation (Aug. 2, 2019), finding Jill failed to prove relocation was necessary to improve standard of living and that a reasonable parenting plan could not be fashioned given travel burdens and impacts on the children.
- Jill filed a motion to reconsider, alleging the court misapplied the statutory factors and offering “new” post‑hearing facts (existence of direct flights; Lance’s difficulty securing after‑school supervision). The trial court granted reconsideration, citing an error in its prior finding about fashioning a parenting plan and noting supervision problems; the court ordered relocation to occur at end of the semester.
- The appellate court reversed the grant of reconsideration: it held the trial court abused its discretion by relying on unproven post‑hearing allegations about supervision, and, on de novo review of the claimed legal error, found no misapplication of law in the original denial; the original denial therefore remained in effect.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court properly granted reconsideration based on alleged new evidence that Lance failed to secure supervision for the children | Jill: post‑hearing facts show Lance left children without regular adult supervision and thus are new, material evidence favoring relocation | Lance: allegations were unproven; he admitted only limited facts (no sitter yet; family sometimes supervised; occasional late returns); demanded strict proof | Appellate: grant based on these unproven allegations was an abuse of discretion; admissions did not constitute the new, competent evidence required to justify reconsideration |
| Whether the trial court misapplied law in initially finding it could not fashion a reasonable parenting plan if relocation were allowed | Jill: the court misapplied statutory factors and undervalued GAL’s view that a workable parenting schedule could be fashioned | Lance: trial court correctly weighed travel time, extracurricular disruption, children’s bonds, and Jill’s weak financial showing; burden to prove relocation is on Jill | Appellate (de novo): no legal error—trial court reasonably applied the relocation factors and properly denied the petition initially |
| Proper standard of review for a motion to reconsider that alleges legal error vs. newly discovered facts | Jill: custody/relocation determinations should be reviewed for manifest weight/abuse of discretion | Lance: mixed standard — de novo for legal misapplication, abuse of discretion for new‑evidence claims | Appellate: applied de novo review to the legal‑error claim and abuse of discretion to the new‑evidence claim; a special concurrence argued manifest‑weight review for the factual re‑evaluation but agreed result would be the same |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316 (1988) (best‑interests standard governs relocation requests)
- Johnson v. Lynch, 66 Ill. 2d 242 (1977) (arguments of counsel are not evidence)
- In re Estate of Wright, 377 Ill. App. 3d 800 (2007) (abuse of discretion standard explained)
- In re Kenneth D., 364 Ill. App. 3d 797 (2006) (trial court’s evidentiary discretion in custody matters)
- In re Estate of Savio, 388 Ill. App. 3d 242 (2009) (distinguishing legal error from factual findings on reconsideration)