In Re Marriage of Padilla and Kowalski, 124 N.E.3d 969

Martha Padilla obtained an emergency ex parte order of protection (Sept. 7, 2016) granting her exclusive physical care and possession of the parties’ 12‑year‑old child and prohibiting Robert Kowalski from contact. The order was repeatedly extended pending a hearing.
Kowalski filed a motion for rehearing/vacatur (Sept. 16, 2016) as provided by the Domestic Violence Act; each extension of the emergency order also entered and continued his rehearing motion.
On Jan. 23, 2017, the trial court ordered that two pending matters (motions to disqualify respondent’s counsel and to remove the guardian ad litem) be set for hearing Mar. 15, 2017 and stated it “cannot hear any additional motions until such time as the above matters are resolved.”
Kowalski timely sought interlocutory review under Supreme Court Rules 307(a)(1) and 307(d); the appeals were consolidated.
The Appellate Court found the Jan. 23 order effectively refused to hear (and thus to dissolve or modify) the injunction represented by the emergency order of protection and held that the trial court violated section 224(e) of the Domestic Violence Act by not setting Kowalski’s rehearing within the statutory 14‑day requirement.
The appellate court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded, directing the trial court to hold the required rehearing within 10 days of the opinion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Padilla)	Defendant's Argument (Kowalski)	Held
Whether the Jan. 23, 2017 order was appealable as an injunction or as a refusal to dissolve/modify an injunction	The order was administrative/docketing only and not an injunction	The order functioned as a de facto injunction because it refused to hear his rehearing motion and thus continued injunctive relief	Court: appealable — substance controls; the order refused to hear a motion to dissolve/modify an injunctive order, so Rule 307 applies, and appellate jurisdiction exists
Whether the trial court violated the Domestic Violence Act by not hearing the rehearing on exclusive possession within 14 days	Trial court has docket control and did not abuse discretion in sequencing hearings	Statute mandates a hearing within 14 days for rehearing exclusive possession; continuance beyond 14 days is prohibited absent agreement	Court: statutory violation. The trial court failed to comply with 750 ILCS 60/224(e); reversal and remand for hearing within 10 days

In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247 (1989) (substance-over-form test for identifying appealable injunctive orders)
In re Marriage of Blitstein, 212 Ill. App. 3d 124 (1991) (order granting exclusive possession affects parties’ everyday activities and is injunctive)
In re Marriage of Fischer, 228 Ill. App. 3d 482 (1992) (order of protection characterized as injunctive relief)
Moore v. Green, 219 Ill. 2d 470 (2006) (Domestic Violence Act pushes protection petitions to top of trial dockets)
People v. O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88 (2001) (statutory "shall" creates mandatory obligation)