In Re Marriage of Johnson
963 N.E.2d 1045
Ill. App. Ct.2011Background
- Petitioner Pamela Johnson and Respondent Eric Johnson divorced in December 2004; MSA was executed resolving all issues and awarded BRF stock to Respondent.
- Petitioner, represented by Berman and Meenan, filed a 2-1401 petition in December 2006 seeking relief from judgment for alleged concealment of material facts by Respondent relating to BRF.
- MSA provided Petitioner with $2,800,000 severance from BRF; BRF interest and related rights were awarded to Respondent.
- Petitioner alleged Respondent concealed BRF facts prior to judgment, including a 2005 Smucker deal that would enhance BRF value; Petitioner claimed this was not disclosed.
- Respondent moved for summary judgment, arguing Petitioner knew or should have known of the Smucker deal by December 1, 2004 and thus lacked due diligence; trial court granted summary judgment in October 2008.
- The trial court subsequently sanctioned Petitioner and sua sponte sanctioned Berman and Meenan; on appeal, Berman and Meenan challenge the sanctions as due process/Rule 137 issues and remand for an evidentiary hearing; the court vacates the sanctions against Berman and Meenan and remands for an evidentiary hearing on sanctions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 137 sanctions against attorneys require a separate hearing. | Berman/Meenan contend no hearing was held before sanctions. | Respondent argues sanctions were properly imposed on petitioner's filing. | Vacated; remanded for evidentiary hearing for sanctions against attorneys. |
| Whether petitioner's and attorneys' due process rights were violated by sua sponte sanctions. | Petitioner argues defendants/attorneys should have been heard separately. | Trial court could impose sanctions sua sponte with hearing for petitioner but without attorney defense. | Remanded for hearing; due process requires party-attorney defense. |
| Whether the court properly found that petitioner had knowledge of the Smucker deal prior to judgment. | Petitioner learned of possible acquisition in 2004 and told attorneys; argued lack of diligence. | Respondent asserts petitioner knew or should have known by December 1, 2004. | Issue reserved for evidentiary development on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Liddle v. Cepeda, 251 Ill.App.3d 892 (1993) (sanctions/no notice issue distinct from pretrial context)
- In re Michael H., 392 Ill.App.3d 965 (2009) (no requirement to file motion for new relief before appeal in some sanctions issues)
- Cardona v. Del Granado, 377 Ill.App.3d 379 (2007) (no prerequisite to file appeal after trial court order)
- Winters v. Kline, 344 Ill.App.3d 919 (2003) (sanctions standards; due process considerations)
- Estate of Baker, 242 Ill.App.3d 684 (1993) (necessity of evidentiary hearing before sanctions; deference to trial court)
- Berg v. Mid-America Industrial, Inc., 293 Ill.App.3d 731 (1997) (require specific findings and hearing for sanctions; reversal when absent)
- Estate of Smith, 201 Ill.App.3d １００５ (1990) (prerequisites for sanctions; need for evidentiary support)
- Riverdale Bank v. Papastratakos, 266 Ill.App.3d 31 (1994) (separate hearing not required under some pre-rule 137 standards when pleadings/evidence show lack of reasonable cause)