2019 IL App (5th) 170295
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- Parties married in 1988; three children (only Katelyn was a minor during proceedings). Don filed for dissolution in Feb 2013; judgment entered May 2017. Both parties appealed portions of the decree.
- Katelyn (born 2000) participated in horse-related activities (riding, hippology/4-H, competitions); parents purchased two horses during the marriage (2010).
- Parties owned marital residence and an adjacent rental property; significant discovery and multiple hearings occurred 2015–2016. Don moved out Nov 2010; separated/filing dates are relevant to dissipation timing.
- The trial court: ordered sale of both properties; awarded each party their respective retirement accounts; ordered Don to pay child support, permanent maintenance to Mary, and half of Katelyn’s private high‑school tuition; found horse expenses were not "extracurricular"; declined to award Mary attorney fees; rejected Mary’s dissipation claim.
- On appeal the court reversed in part (extracurricular classification; prima facie dissipation finding), vacated portions of the debt allocation, and remanded for further proceedings on those issues; affirmed remaining rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Mary’s Argument | Don’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Katelyn’s horse‑related expenses are "extracurricular activities" under 750 ILCS 5/505 | Horse activities (hippology, competitions, riding, 4‑H) enhance educational/athletic development and thus qualify | Court has discretion; even if extracurricular, trial court could reasonably deny contribution | Reversed: horse activities are extracurricular; remand to determine reasonable share and whether Don must contribute |
| Whether trial court erred by ordering sale of marital home and rental property | Mary sought award of home to custodial parent (sentimental value, child stability); parties presented valuation evidence | Don argued parties offered no competent, timely appraisal evidence | Affirmed: parties failed to present competent, near‑time valuation; sale and split of proceeds was reasonable; Mary given right to buy out Don’s interest pre‑listing |
| Whether trial court assigned all marital debts and allocated them equitably | Mary contends many debts (medical, stable, loans from relatives, unpaid boarding/vet bills) were not assigned; she offered a large evidentiary exhibit | Don relied on court’s limited assignments and contested foundation for Mary’s exhibit | Vacated in part and remanded: court failed to rule on admissibility/foundation of Mary’s Exhibit 3; remand to allow proof and equitable allocation of unaddressed debts |
| Whether Mary made a prima facie showing of dissipation from Don’s checking account withdrawals | Mary presented bank statements and spreadsheets showing large unexplained cash withdrawals (Nov 2010–July 2016) shifting burden to Don to account for expenditures | Don argued cash usage was typical household spending and Mary failed to prove dissipation | Reversed: Mary made a prima facie showing for period from parties’ separation (Nov 2010) through July 2016; remanded for Don to rebut with clear, specific explanations |
| Whether Mary was entitled to half of funds withdrawn from Don’s liquidated retirement accounts | Mary argued liquidations were dissipation or marital funds so she should get half (Don allegedly withdrew $21,150; $7,147.27 remained un-deposited) | Don said withdrawals paid court‑ordered debts; court previously ordered deposit but funds not deposited; Mary’s dissipation notice did not identify retirement funds specifically | Affirmed: Mary’s dissipation notice did not identify retirement withdrawals as required by statute, so court properly declined award; awarding each party their remaining retirement assets was within discretion |
| Whether trial court abused discretion in denying Mary attorney fees | Mary argued disparity of incomes and inability to pay justified fee award | Court noted maintenance award, distribution of assets, and both parties prolonged litigation; concluded each should pay own fees | Affirmed: no abuse of discretion given maintenance award and equitable property division |
| Whether Don should pay half of Katelyn’s private high‑school tuition | Mary/Katelyn testified private school offers better science curriculum, proximity to mother’s workplace, extracurriculars tied to career goals | Don argued public school would be adequate and contest was discretionary | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion ordering Don to pay half of private school expenses (minor child’s educational needs and standard of living considered) |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Marriage of Suriano, 324 Ill. App. 3d 839 (statutory construction and plain‑meaning approach)
- In re Marriage of Blaisdell, 142 Ill. App. 3d 1034 (use of subsequent statutory amendment as interpretive aid)
- In re Marriage of Woolsey, 85 Ill. App. 3d 636 (trial court valuation of real estate; evidentiary sufficiency)
- In re Marriage of Jerome, 255 Ill. App. 3d 374 (valuation and dissipation principles; burden shifting)
- In re Marriage of Tietz, 238 Ill. App. 3d 965 (equitable distribution, dissipation, and evidentiary standards for explanations)
- In re Marriage of Holthaus, 387 Ill. App. 3d 367 (definition and timing of dissipation)
- Evans v. Evans, 85 Ill. 2d 523 (discretion in dividing retirement benefits)