In Re Marriage of Gibbs
227 Ariz. 403
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- Hyatt and Lethia Gibbs divorced in 1988; Vanetta, their child, was a minor with disabilities and subject to a support order until age 22 under the dissolution decree.
- Before Vanetta turned 22, Lethia sought continued support; Hyatt refused but suggested non-litigation support in a 1993 letter.
- In 1993 the parties entered a stipulation ending Hyatt's child-support obligation; an order followed terminating support.
- In 2005 Lethia moved to reinstate support for Vanetta; guardian ad litem appointed; after years of proceedings, Hyatt moved to join Vanetta as a party.
- In 2010, the trial court found Vanetta severely mentally or physically disabled under § 25-320 and ordered support under that statute, but denied reinstatement based on res judicata; court also ruled Vanetta was not a party, and remanded for merits review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 1993 stipulation precludes current claim | Lethia argues res judicata bars reinstatement. | Hyatt argues the stipulation precludes all related claims. | No; res judicata does not bar under § 25-320 modification policy. |
| Whether Vanetta can be bound by or benefit from the 1993 stipulation | Vanetta, as beneficiary, should be a party and able to pursue relief. | Vanetta may not be bound if not a party to the 1993 order. | Vanetta is a party; preclusion analysis must address her claim. |
| Whether waiver, laches, or equitable estoppel preclude reinstatement | Waiver/laches/estoppel should apply due to delay. | No prejudice shown; delay alone not enough to preclude. | No error; these doctrines do not bar the claim. |
| Whether the trial court properly concluded Vanetta satisfied § 25-320(E) disability | Vanetta meets the ‘severely mentally disabled’ standard and began disability before majority. | Evidence insufficient to prove severe disability. | Court’s finding of severe disability supported by substantial evidence. |
| Whether guardian ad litem fees should be allocated | Fees should be allocated to reflect contributions and statutory framework. | Omission on final order requires remand for proper FEES allocation. | Remand to address guardian ad litem fees. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hall v. Lalli, 194 Ariz. 54 (1999) (standard for preclusion, merits-based)
- Mendoza v. Mendoza, 177 Ariz. 603 (1994) (§ 25-320; broadened jurisdiction for disabled child support)
- Gersten v. Gersten, 223 Ariz. 99 (2009) (§ 25-320 permits ordering support for disabled adult child)
- Evans v. Evans, 17 Ariz.App. 323 (1972) (child support modification focus on welfare of child)
- Pettit v. Pettit, 218 Ariz. 529 (2008) (preclusion scope; issues could have been presented)
- Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518 (1999) (continuing jurisdiction in modification)
- In re Marriage of Williams, 219 Ariz. 546 (2008) (attorney-fee considerations and resources)