In re Marn Family Litigation.
SCWC-10-0000181
| Haw. | Dec 21, 2016Background
- Dispute among Marn siblings over ownership/control of McCully Associates (MA), a family limited partnership; Annabelle Marn’s partnership interest passed to the Annabelle Y. Dunn Trust (AYD Trust) after her death.
- Alexander (and Eric) sued in 1998 seeking (1) declaratory relief about partners’ rights under the Partnership and Transfer Restriction Agreements and (2) specific performance (a buyout) to require sale of Annabelle’s interest.
- AYD Trust filed answers in December 1998 that included jury-trial demands; early trial-setting orders designated the Buyout case as a jury trial.
- Years later, the circuit court treated the Buyout case as jury-waived, held a bench trial (2007), and entered judgment denying specific performance and finding the AYD Trust not obligated to sell; partial final judgment entered October 25, 2010.
- ICA affirmed in 2016, reasoning the suit’s sole remedy was equitable specific performance and thus no jury right; Alexander sought certiorari arguing he had a right to jury trial because he sought declaratory (legal) relief and the AYD Trust’s jury demand was never withdrawn.
- Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding Alexander was entitled to a jury trial on his declaratory-judgment claim and that the jury demand was properly made and not withdrawn.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Marn) | Defendant's Argument (Dunn/AYD Trust) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Alexander was entitled to a jury trial | The complaint sought declaratory relief (legal rights under the Partnership/Transfer Agreements) so jury trial is preserved | The action sought specific performance (equitable relief) as sole remedy, so no jury right; alternatively, jury demand was waived/not timely | Held: Alexander entitled to jury trial because declaratory relief is legal in nature and preserves jury right; ICA erred by focusing only on specific performance |
| Whether a jury demand was properly made and preserved | AYD Trust filed valid jury demands in Dec. 1998; those demands fixed the case status and were not withdrawn | AYD Trust (later positions) and circuit court treated there as no jury demand; argued any earlier demand was not operative or was waived | Held: Jury demand was timely made by AYD Trust under HRCP 38 and was not shown to have been withdrawn with consent; thus jury right preserved |
| Waiver — whether Alexander waived jury right by failing to object at trial | Alexander joined motions/oppositions and counsel raised jury issue at pretrial; preserved | AYD Trust contended Alexander failed to object at trial and thus waived | Held: Issue was preserved—record shows objections and pretrial dispute over jury; waiver not established |
| Mootness — whether the right to jury is moot because MA dissolved and assets sold | Alexander argued no final accounting/distribution of proceeds; declaratory resolution still could affect proceeds distribution | AYD Trust argued dissolution and liquidation render any buyout claim moot | Held: Not moot as to potential distribution of proceeds; court could still grant effective relief (e.g., different share of proceeds) |
Key Cases Cited
- Kimball v. Lincoln, 809 P.2d 1130 (Haw. 1991) (declaratory-judgment issues are legal in nature and triable by jury even if specific performance claim is equitable)
- Lee v. Aiu, 936 P.2d 655 (Haw. 1997) (test for jury-trial right looks to nature of remedy—legal v. equitable)
- Mehau v. Reed, 869 P.2d 1320 (Haw. 1994) (a proper jury demand by one litigant fixes the case status; other parties need not file separate demand)
- County of Hawai'i v. Ala Loop Homeowners, 235 P.3d 1103 (Haw. 2010) (mootness: case is moot if court can no longer grant effective relief)
- In re Gentry Revocable Tr., 378 P.3d 874 (Haw. 2016) (even if assets sold, case not necessarily moot where proceeds remain undistributed)