in Re Mark H. Henry, M.D., 388 S.W.3d 719

Henry and Masson were former orthopedic partners with concurrent litigation against each other in 2003.
Settlement Agreement dated March 19, 2004 required Henry to transfer Hepburn Estates to Masson in exchange for $150,000 and released other claims unless arising from the Settlement itself.
Masson separated his practice after Henry missed a windup deadline, Henry transferred Hepburn Estates to Masson, and Masson did not pay $150,000.
November 15, 2004 jury found both sides substantially breached, with Henry breaching first, awarding Masson $75,000 damages and $25,000 in attorney’s fees.
On remand, the trial court granted Masson’s motion to sever Henry’s $150,000 credit claim from Masson’s $100,000 breach verdict, creating separate proceedings.
Henry sought mandamus and a direct appeal challenging the severance; the Court denied mandamus and, on direct appeal, vacated the severance and ordered judgment recognizing Henry’s $150,000 credit offset by Masson’s $100,000 award.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether severance of Henry’s $150,000 credit claim was proper	Henry argues severance was improper and final judgment should reflect the credit.	Masson argues severance finalized Henry’s claim and allowed retrial.	Severance was improper; the case must reflect the credit and offset prior jury damages.
Whether mandamus or direct appeal is proper to review the severance	Henry contends mandamus is appropriate to challenge the severance.	Masson argues mandamus is proper when no adequate appellate remedy exists.	Direct appeal is the proper vehicle; mandamus denied.
What is the effect of the prior mandate and law-of-the-case on remand	Henry relies on the law-of-the-case that Masson owes $150,000.	Masson contends remand limits and allows severance.	On remand, Henry is entitled to $150,000 credit offset by Masson’s $100,000 award; case remanded for final judgment accordingly.

In re Odyssey Healthcare, Inc., 310 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2010) (mandamus standards for abuse of discretion)
In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. 2003) (clear abuse of discretion; law application not discretionary)
In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (definitions of discretion and law application)
Beckham Grp., P.C. v. Snyder, 315 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010) (severance review and finality of judgments)
Liu v. 290 S.W.3d 520, 290 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009) (when severance yields independent actions, review standards apply)
Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1986) (mandamus related to remand scope and proceedings)
Dearing, 240 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007) (law-of-the-case scope and remand guidance)
Freightliner Corp. v. Motor Vehicle Bd. of Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 255 S.W.3d 356 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008) (interpretation of appellate mandates on remand)
Briscoe v. Goodmark Corp., 102 S.W.3d 714 (Tex. 2003) (law-of-the-case and finality principles)
Brown & Brown of Tex., Inc. v. Omni Metals, Inc., 317 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. 2010) (uniformity and finality in successive stages of litigation)