History
  • No items yet
midpage
In re: Marisela Dangcil
CC-16-1185-FCTa
| 9th Cir. BAP | Mar 21, 2017
Read the full case

Background

  • Debtor Marisela Dangcil was on title to a Brea, CA residential property; the promissory note was in Victor Chavez’s name and later assigned to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase).
  • Dangcil stopped making mortgage payments for about eight years, producing a large arrearage and an increased loan balance (Chase claimed ~$1.29M owed; property valuations ranged from ~$531k to ~$892k).
  • Chase moved for relief from the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1), (2), and (4), alleging lack of adequate protection, no equity/need for reorganization, and that the bankruptcy filing was part of a scheme to hinder creditors.
  • The bankruptcy court held hearings, admitted supplemental valuations, and granted relief from stay; its written order checked boxes for § 362(d)(1), (2), and (4) but did not explain any § 362(d)(4) basis.
  • Dangcil appealed, arguing lack of due process (improper service), that a loan modification existed and provided equity/adequate protection, and challenging the § 362(d)(4) finding.

Issues

Issue Dangcil's Argument Chase's Argument Held
Did failure to properly serve papers deny Dangcil due process? Chase failed to serve her with motion/supplemental appraisal, so she lacked notice and opportunity to respond. Dangcil had actual notice, responded, and appeared at hearings; she waived procedural objection by not raising it below. Court: No due process violation (waived and no prejudice).
Was there "cause" under § 362(d)(1) (lack of adequate protection)? Dangcil asserted equity existed and a loan modification would protect Chase. Loan balance (including accrued interest/advances) exceeded property value; debtor missed ~94 payments over 8 years. Court: Relief under § 362(d)(1) proper — lack of adequate protection and persistent nonpayment constitute cause.
Did an alleged loan modification bar stay relief? Dangcil contended parties had agreed to a modification, which would create equity. No executed modification or proof of assent; draft terms would have increased principal, not reduced it. Court: No enforceable modification shown; it would not have created equity; argument rejected.
Was § 362(d)(4) relief supported (scheme to hinder/defraud)? Dangcil challenged imposition of § 362(d)(4) relief. Chase pleaded § 362(d)(4) in motion and relied on borrower statements. Court: Inclusion of § 362(d)(4) was unsupported by the record/oral ruling; reversed as to § 362(d)(4) only; other relief affirmed.

Key Cases Cited

  • Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (due-process notice standard: notice reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties)
  • In re Rosson, 545 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2008) (procedural defects require showing of prejudice)
  • HSBC Bank USA v. Blendheim, 803 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2015) (notice and hearing standard reviewed as mixed question)
  • United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir. 2009) (two-part abuse-of-discretion review: legal standard de novo; factual findings for clear error)
  • MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 755 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1985) (no fixed definition of "cause" under § 362(d)(1); case-by-case inquiry)
  • Price v. Delaware State Police Fed. Credit Union, 370 F.3d 362 (3d Cir. 2004) (persistent failure to make payments can constitute cause for stay relief)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: In re: Marisela Dangcil
Court Name: United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Mar 21, 2017
Docket Number: CC-16-1185-FCTa
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir. BAP