In re: Marckson Saint Fleur
824 F.3d 1337
| 11th Cir. | 2016Background
- Marckson Saint Fleur sought authorization under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3)(A) to file a second or successive § 2255 motion based on Johnson/Welch.
- He was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)) (Count 4) and using, carrying, and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) (Count 5); he pled guilty to both counts.
- Johnson held the ACCA residual clause void for vagueness; Welch held Johnson is retroactive on collateral review. Saint Fleur argued Johnson undermines the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause so his § 924(c) conviction/sentence is invalid.
- § 924(c)(3) defines “crime of violence” via (A) a use-of-force elements clause and (B) a residual clause involving substantial risk; Johnson addressed the ACCA residual clause, not directly § 924(c)(3)(B).
- The indictment charged Hobbs Act robbery by actual or threatened force or fear of injury—matching the use-of-force elements clause in § 924(c)(3)(A).
- The panel concluded Saint Fleur’s § 924(c) conviction rested on the § 924(c)(3)(A) use-of-force clause, so his claim fails to make a prima facie showing under § 2255(h).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Johnson’s new rule invalidates § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause and thus authorizes a successive § 2255 | Johnson/Welch apply to § 924(c)(3)(B), so Saint Fleur’s § 924(c) sentence is void if the offense relied on that residual clause | Even if Johnson applies to § 924(c)(3)(B), the § 924(c) sentence here was based on the § 924(c)(3)(A) use-of-force clause (Hobbs Act robbery), not the residual clause | Denied: no prima facie showing because conviction rests on the use-of-force clause, so authorization to file is not warranted |
| Whether the court of appeals should resolve merits at authorization stage or leave to district court | Saint Fleur implicitly: the claim has merit under Johnson warranting review | Government/panel: threshold prima facie inquiry is required; merits review is generally not appropriate at this stage | Panel applied prima facie review and found authorization unwarranted; concurring opinion cautioned against merits-style dismissal at this stage and urged deference to district courts |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause held unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson applies retroactively on collateral review)
- In re Pinder, 824 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting unsettled law whether Johnson applies to § 924(c)(3)(B); remand approach)
- Jordan v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 485 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining appellate prima facie threshold review for successive petitions)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (COA standard discussion; threshold inquiry guidance)