5 Cal. 5th 785
Cal.2018Background
- Abelino Manriquez was convicted of four first‑degree murders, sentenced to death in 1993, and his convictions/sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
- Posttrial, a juror (C.B.), who served as foreperson, disclosed that she had been physically and sexually abused as a child; she had not disclosed that history on the pretrial juror questionnaire (questions asked about victimization and exposure to violence).
- C.B. completed the questionnaire marking most relevant items “No”; after the penalty phase she voluntarily reported her childhood abuse on a posttrial questionnaire and later declarations.
- The Supreme Court issued an order to show cause and referred four questions to a referee addressing (1) reasons for nondisclosure, (2) whether nondisclosure was intentional, (3) whether nondisclosure indicated bias, and (4) whether C.B. was actually biased.
- After an evidentiary hearing the referee found C.B. credible, concluded her nondisclosure was inadvertent, and found no actual bias; the Supreme Court generally accepted these findings and denied habeas relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Manriquez) | Defendant's Argument (People) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether juror nondisclosure of childhood abuse on questionnaire and voir dire constituted prejudicial juror misconduct | C.B. concealed material facts that would have shown bias against mitigation; concealment deprived defense of peremptory challenge and trial strategy | Nondisclosure was an honest mistake; C.B. did not interpret her childhood as criminal/violent and only recalled it when mitigation was presented; no substantial likelihood of actual bias | Court: Nondisclosure was misconduct but petitioner failed to prove a substantial likelihood of actual bias; habeas relief denied |
| Whether nondisclosure was intentional or inadvertent | Intentional concealment inferred from clear questionnaire and C.B.’s subsequent statements | C.B. sincerely believed questions referred to adult events and did not view her childhood as a crime/violent act; she honestly answered in good faith | Court: Supported referee’s finding that nondisclosure was unintentional and in good faith |
| Whether C.B.’s life experiences and statements during deliberations showed actual bias against petitioner | Similarity of C.B.’s childhood to petitioner’s and her declared view that childhood abuse is not an excuse created a substantial likelihood of bias | Jurors may properly interpret mitigation through their life experiences; C.B. participated, was candid, and there is no evidence her experiences prevented impartial deliberation | Court: No substantial likelihood of actual bias; life‑experience reasoning permitted in penalty phase |
| Whether the presumption of prejudice from concealment was rebutted | Presumption not rebutted because concealment harmed jury selection and trial strategy; peremptory challenge lost | Rebutted by evidence of C.B.’s good faith, cooperation, credibility, and lack of indicia of prejudice | Court: Presumption rebutted—no relief granted |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Hitchings, 6 Cal.4th 97 (Cal. 1993) (voir dire’s role; nondisclosure undermines jury selection)
- In re Boyette, 56 Cal.4th 866 (Cal. 2013) (unintentional nondisclosure may not show substantial likelihood of bias)
- In re Hamilton, 20 Cal.4th 273 (Cal. 1999) (good‑faith mistakes on voir dire weight against finding bias)
- McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (U.S. 1984) (perfect voir dire is unattainable; honest mistakes tolerated)
- People v. Nesler, 16 Cal.4th 561 (Cal. 1997) (definition of actual bias and when impressions disqualify jurors)
- People v. Wilson, 44 Cal.4th 758 (Cal. 2008) (penalty‑phase jurors may use life experiences to assess mitigation)
- People v. Ray, 13 Cal.4th 313 (Cal. 1996) (posttrial voluntary disclosure suggests lack of hidden agenda)
- People v. Blackwell, 191 Cal.App.3d 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (clear voir dire + no explanation supports inference of intentional concealment)
- People v. McPeters, 2 Cal.4th 1148 (Cal. 1992) (serious, traumatic nondisclosure less likely to be inadvertent)
- Diaz v. Superior Court, 152 Cal.App.3d 926 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (juror victimization similar to charged crime may create risk of prejudice)
- Sampson v. United States, 724 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2013) (juror’s deliberate concealment of life experiences warranted vacatur in capital case)
- Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 1996) (a rape victim is not automatically disqualified from serving on a rape trial jury)