In Re Manning H.
M2020-00663-COA-r3-PT
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Jul 13, 2021Background
- Parents divorced in 2015; they have two children, Maverick (son) and Manning (daughter). A permanent parenting plan gave Father equal time with Maverick but no parenting time with Manning; Father paid reduced support per a private side agreement.
- Father last saw Manning on January 10, 2015; he consistently exercised visitation with Maverick thereafter and paid some support to Mother but not the portion allocated to Manning under the private agreement.
- Mother later married Stepfather; in August 2018 Mother and Stepfather petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights to Manning, alleging abandonment (failure to visit and failure to support) and § 36-1-113(g)(14) (failure to manifest willingness/ability and likely substantial harm if custody returned).
- At trial the court found Father abandoned Manning by failure to visit during the relevant statutory period but did not find abandonment by failure to support.
- The court held Petitioners failed to prove § 36-1-113(g)(14) because they did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that placing Manning with Father would likely cause substantial harm, and it also found termination was not in Manning’s best interests. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Father abandoned Manning by failing to visit (willfulness) | Petitioners: Father willfully failed to visit Manning for the statutory period and thus abandoned her. | Father: His failure to visit was not willful — he was coerced by Mother’s threats and later chose to avoid visits because Manning cried. | Court: Abandonment by failure to visit proved; Father’s explanations were inconsistent and he made no effort to modify the plan. |
| Whether Father abandoned by failing to support | Petitioners: Father failed to pay support for Manning as ordered. | Father: He paid $465/mo per the private arrangement and through relatives despite limited income. | Court: Not proved — Father paid support consistent with the private agreement; failure-to-support ground not established. |
| Whether § 36-1-113(g)(14) is established (failed to manifest willingness/ability; placing child with parent would cause substantial harm) | Petitioners: Father manifested no willingness/ability to assume custody and placing Manning with him would cause substantial psychological harm because she does not know him. | Father: He demonstrated ability and willingness (good parenting of Maverick); any introduction to Manning can be gradual and therapeutic. | Court: First prong (failure to manifest willingness) supported; second prong (substantial harm) not proved by clear and convincing evidence — g(14) not established. |
| Whether termination is in the child’s best interest | Petitioners: Maintaining status quo risks long-term harm; termination would provide stability and reflect Manning’s existing parent–child relationship with Stepfather. | Father: Home is safe; he is attentive to his son and can develop a relationship with Manning; long-term benefit to having both fathers; therapy can mitigate short-term disruption. | Court: Termination is not in Manning’s best interest; ordered supervised, therapeutic introduction instead. |
Key Cases Cited
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (constitutional standard for parental-rights termination)
- Keisling v. Keisling, 92 S.W.3d 374 (Tenn. 2002) (parents’ constitutional interest in custody)
- In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586 (Tenn. 2010) (clear-and-convincing standard in termination cases)
- In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507 (Tenn. 2016) (appellate review of termination findings and best-interest analysis)
- In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659 (Tenn. 2020) (interpretation of § 36-1-113(g)(14) first prong)
- Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (definition and probability threshold for "substantial harm")
- White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (best-interest analysis is fact-specific; weight of factors varies)
- In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (clear-and-convincing evidence requirement)
- In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528 (Tenn. 2006) (appellate standard for reviewing termination findings)
- In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539 (Tenn. 2002) (statutory two-part test: grounds and best interest)