In re Malachii O.
2017 R.I. LEXIS 16
R.I.2017Background
- In March 2012 DCYF learned respondent John S. allegedly abused his ten‑month‑old son Malachii (pinching/slapping/throwing), leading to criminal charges in Massachusetts, a no‑contact order, and respondent’s incarceration beginning March 2012.
- Paternity was confirmed by test in October 2013 after respondent requested testing; respondent remained incarcerated in Massachusetts and was moved between facilities, delaying service and appointment of counsel.
- DCYF filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights in November 2013; mother consented to termination and child was placed in a preadoptive home.
- At trial (telephonic participation by respondent) the caseworker testified DCYF did not pursue reunification with respondent because of the no‑contact order and his criminal conviction; respondent had sent two letters over ~2½ years and made no visitation or formal efforts to modify the no‑contact order.
- Family Court terminated parental rights on grounds of abandonment (§ 15‑7‑7(a)(4)) and, alternatively, institutionalization/unfitness due to imprisonment (§ 15‑7‑7(a)(2)(i)). Supreme Court affirmed on abandonment grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (DCYF) | Defendant's Argument (John S.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether respondent abandoned child under § 15‑7‑7(a)(4) | Lack of contact >6 months creates prima facie abandonment; respondent had no meaningful contact >2 years and provided no support | Respondent was legally and practically prevented from contact by incarceration and no‑contact orders and made some efforts (letters, paternity request) | Court held abandonment proven: statutory prima facie period unrebutted; incarceration/no‑contact do not excuse failure to maintain contact |
| Whether DCYF failed to make reasonable reunification efforts (statutory) | Not necessary to show when termination based on abandonment | DCYF should have tried to reach/respond given child in agency custody and barriers to contact | Court: no need to decide because abandonment alone sufficed; DCYF’s limited efforts were reasonable under circumstances |
| Whether imprisonment alone warrants termination under § 15‑7‑7(a)(2)(i) | Incarceration resulting from abuse made extended care improbable | Respondent argued incarceration and orders prevented contact/support; DCYF didn’t case‑plan while he was out‑of‑state | Court did not rely on this ground (affirmed on abandonment) but indicated incarceration tied to abuse supports unfitness finding if necessary |
| Procedural sufficiency of service/representation | Service and notice were adequate; respondent was represented and participated telephonically | Respondent asserted defective service/arraignment and lack of conviction record | Court found record shows adequate notice, counsel, opportunity to participate; defects immaterial to result |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Amiah P., 54 A.3d 446 (R.I. 2012) (standard of review and parental‑fitness framework)
- In re Victoria L., 950 A.2d 1168 (R.I. 2008) (Deference to Family Court factual findings)
- In re Jazlyn P., 31 A.3d 1273 (R.I. 2011) (clear‑and‑convincing proof required to terminate parental rights)
- In re Shanelly C., 785 A.2d 1129 (R.I. 2001) (lack of communication over six months as evidence of abandonment)
- In re DeKarri P., 787 A.2d 1170 (R.I. 2001) (incarcerated parent can abandon child by failing to pursue contact)
- In re Amanda D., 918 A.2d 220 (R.I. 2007) (parent’s responsibility to maintain contact even if children are in agency custody)
- In re Serenity K., 891 A.2d 881 (R.I. 2006) (incarceration does not automatically excuse statutory abandonment)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (state must prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence)