In re Macklin, 286 A.3d 547

Background:

Macklin was arrested in Sept. 2018 on assault/weapon charges; competency concerns led to inpatient evaluation at St. Elizabeths.
In Sept. 2019 the criminal court found Macklin incompetent and unlikely to regain competence (a "Jackson" finding), requiring either release or civil commitment.
The District filed a civil-commitment petition under the Ervin Act; Macklin was remanded to inpatient care pending the Commission hearing under the IDCCA, § 24-531.07(c)(1).
The Mental Health Commission recommended inpatient commitment but did not explicitly state the least-restrictive-alternative finding; proceedings were delayed by COVID-19.
The trial/family court ordered Macklin released, reasoning § 21-526(d) (which permits continuation of emergency hospitalization) did not apply because the District never initiated emergency hospitalization; the D.C. government appealed.
The Superior Court later entered a final civil-commitment order (outpatient treatment); this appeal was technically moot but was decided on the merits.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a defendant remanded to an inpatient facility under IDCCA § 24-531.07(c)(1) may be detained pending civil-commitment completion under Ervin Act § 21-526(d) absent prior emergency hospitalization	Macklin: § 21-526(d) applies only to persons already detained for "emergency observation and diagnosis," so absent initiation of subchapter III procedures detention cannot be continued	D.C.: cross-references and IDCCA structure permit continued detention pending civil commitment even if emergency hospitalization steps were not separately initiated	Majority: Reversed release — defendants remanded under § 24-531.07(c)(1) may be detained pending civil-commitment if requisite findings are made; the presupposition of prior emergency hospitalization is a drafting error that would produce absurd results if enforced
Whether the probable-cause hearing right in § 24-531.07(c)(2) requires that an emergency-hospitalization petition previously have been filed under § 21-523/21-524	Macklin: § 24-531.07(c)(2) imports § 21-525 only for emergency detainees, so without an earlier § 21-523 petition the procedures do not apply	D.C.: § 24-531.07(c)(2) was intended to give a § 21-525-type probable cause check regardless of whether emergency hospitalization had been separately initiated	Majority: § 24-531.07(c)(2) grants the § 21-525-type probable-cause hearing right to remanded defendants; cross-references should not be read to require prior emergency petitions
Whether the court may treat cross-references between the IDCCA and the Ervin Act as a drafting error and disregard the literal presupposition of emergency hospitalization to avoid absurdity	Macklin: court should apply plain text; if legislature wants broader detention it should amend statutes	D.C.: literal text produces impractical and absurd timing/duplication problems, justifying correction of drafting error	Majority: Court invokes narrow drafting-error relief to correct apparent technical conflict and give effect to legislative intent; dissent objects and would leave text intact

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (establishes that a state must either civilly commit or release a defendant found incompetent and unlikely to regain competence)
In re Herman, 619 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1993) (describes the probable-cause focus and expedited hearing requirements for emergency hospitalization under the Ervin Act)
In re Lomax, 386 A.2d 1185 (D.C. 1978) (explains the Ervin Act’s expedited timetables and presumption of liberty during civil-commitment proceedings)
In re Reed, 571 A.2d 801 (D.C. 1990) (noting that Commission recommendations do not immediately deprive a person of liberty pending judicial proceedings)
In re DeLoatch, 532 A.2d 1343 (D.C. 1987) (discusses balance between liberty interests and public safety under the Ervin Act)
In re Walker, 856 A.2d 579 (D.C. 2004) (principle that Ervin Act should be construed narrowly where liberty is curtailed)
Roberts v. United States, 216 A.3d 870 (D.C. 2019) (statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo)
Tippett v. Daly, 10 A.3d 1123 (D.C. 2010) (statutes must be read in context; holistic interpretation)
Lamia v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004) (court generally should not correct drafting errors absent exceptional circumstances)
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001) (recognizes that cross-references may sometimes reflect drafting mistakes)
Gilmore v. United States, 699 A.2d 1130 (D.C. 1997) (court corrected a clerical drafting error to avoid absurd result)
Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021) (drafting-error doctrine applies only in exceptional circumstances to obvious technical errors)