In re M.I.
44 N.E.3d 600
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- M.I., adjudicated neglected in 2010, became a ward of the court and DCFS was appointed guardian; respondent J.B. is the biological father.
- DCFS required J.B. to cooperate, complete drug/alcohol assessment and testing, attend parenting classes, and submit to a psychological exam; J.B. completed the psychological exam and parenting class but had inconsistent visitation and service compliance.
- The psychological evaluation (2011) showed J.B. has an IQ of 58 (extremely low range), kindergarten–third-grade functioning, and cannot parent independently; it recommended modified services and assessment of adaptive functioning.
- DCFS caseworker testified J.B. was homeless, failed to provide an address, missed many visits and drug tests, and continued cannabis use; the caseworker provided referrals but did not modify service plans or offer homemaker/adaptive supports.
- The State filed to terminate J.B.’s parental rights in May 2014 on two grounds: failure to make reasonable progress during Aug. 1, 2013–May 1, 2014 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii)) and failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b)).
- The trial court found J.B. unfit on both statutory grounds and terminated parental rights; the appellate majority reversed and remanded, concluding the fitness findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence because DCFS failed to adapt services to J.B.’s intellectual disability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (J.B.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Did J.B. fail to make reasonable progress (Aug 1, 2013–May 1, 2014)? | J.B. missed visitations, drug testing, and did not comply with service tasks during the statutory 9-month period. | Majority: Many adverse facts were outside the statutory period and DCFS never tailored services to his IQ; inability vs. willful refusal should be considered. | Reversed: fitness finding on this ground was against the manifest weight because DCFS did not modify services for J.B.’s disabilities and much evidence relied on was outside the nine-month window. |
| 2) Did J.B. fail to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility? | J.B. had minimal contact, sporadic visits, refused to cooperate with DCFS, and did not complete drug treatment/testing. | J.B. argued his intellectual disability and lack of accommodations explain noncompliance; DCFS should have provided modified services/assessments. | Reversed: the court concluded DCFS failed to consider/modify tasks for his mental deficits; therefore termination on this ground was against manifest weight. |
| 3) Did DCFS violate obligations (ADA/504) or otherwise fail to provide reasonable accommodations relevant to fitness? | State/caseworker: offered referrals, bus passes, and community resources; J.B. refused or misused supports; no specific ADA claim was litigated below. | J.B.: DCFS failed to implement recommended modified services and adaptive living assessment after psychological exam; alleged (on appeal) ADA/§504 failures. | Majority: Although ADA not required for decision, Illinois law requires measuring parental progress in light of circumstances (here, intellectual disability); DCFS failed to modify services. Dissent: procedural/default and not required. Court remanded. |
| 4) Could the trial court be affirmed under 1(D)(p) (inability to discharge parental responsibilities due to mental impairment), despite lack of pleading? | Dissent/State: evidence shows J.B. will never be able to parent; terminating rights should be affirmed to protect child’s permanence. | Majority: State did not plead 1(D)(p); court cannot base termination on unpled statutory ground; also lack of evidence about whether accommodations could preserve visitation. | Reversed: appellate majority refused to affirm on unpled 1(D)(p) ground and remanded for further proceedings. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Petition of L.M., 385 Ill. App. 3d 393 (discusses two-step termination analysis and fitness/best-interest framework)
- In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198 (any one statutory ground of unfitness is sufficient)
- In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405 (standard of review for fitness findings; deference to trial court credibility assessments)
- In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329 (trial court may only consider evidence within the statutory nine-month period for reasonable progress under section 1(D)(m))
- In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239 (cooperation with service plans and visitation relevant to interest/concern grounds)
- In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340 (court cannot terminate parental rights on grounds not alleged in the petition)
- In re Workman, 56 Ill. App. 3d 1007 (parent retains rights until found unfit; unfitness does not automatically mandate termination)