In Re Lydia N.-S.
M2016-00964-COA-R3-PT
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Jan 31, 2017Background
- Lydia born April 3, 2012; mother (Loren K.) moved to Nashville when Lydia was ~3 months; father (Jorge N.-S.) later moved to Delaware.
- Father pled guilty in June 2013 to two counts of rape and received concurrent 25‑year sentences (with layered supervision/work‑release/home‑confinement provisions) and sex‑offender registration.
- Mother married Stepfather in late 2013; Mother and Stepfather filed to terminate Father’s parental rights and to adopt Lydia (petition filed Oct. 3, 2013; amended to add incarceration ground).
- Petition alleged abandonment by willful failure to support/visit (including the 4 months immediately before incarceration) and a statutory ground based on confinement under a sentence of 10+ years while the child was under eight.
- Trial occurred April 5, 2016 with Father appearing by telephone after a court denied his motion to continue until he could be present in person; trial court terminated Father’s rights on abandonment (failure to support in the 4 months before incarceration) and the 10+ year incarceration ground, and found termination was in the child’s best interest.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Motion to continue trial | Father asked for continuance until Oct. 2016 so he could appear in person after expected release | Telephonic participation was sufficient; statutory duty to expedite TPR hearings; delay not shown to be in child’s best interest | Denial affirmed; court did not abuse discretion—statute permits telephonic participation and record shows effective participation |
| Sufficiency of statutory grounds (abandonment — failure to support for 4 months before incarceration) | Petitioners: Father paid no support in Feb–May 2013 despite earning substantial income then; Mother set up bank account for deposits | Father did not contest factual findings on this ground on appeal | Ground proven by clear and convincing evidence; affirmed |
| Sufficiency of statutory grounds (incarceration ≥10 years while child <8) | Petitioners: Father’s sentencing order imposes >10‑year sentence while child was under eight | Father did not dispute this ground | Ground is a "bright line" statutory basis; proven by conviction/sentence and affirmed |
| Best‑interest determination | Petitioners: multiple §36‑1‑113(i) factors favor termination (lack of relationship/visitation, child bonded to mother/stepfather, father’s criminal history, failure to support, instability) | Father argued court misweighed factors, relied on speculation, and should have allowed visitation rather than termination | Court’s fact‑intensive weighing supported termination; appellate court modified to omit two factors lacking clear and convincing proof (factor 2 and 8) but affirmed overall best‑interest ruling |
Key Cases Cited
- Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (U.S. 1972) (parental custody is a fundamental liberty interest)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (heightened proof requirement in parental‑rights termination cases)
- In re Adoption of A.M.H., 215 S.W.3d 793 (Tenn. 2007) (statutorily defined grounds required for termination; best‑interest standard)
- Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737 (Tenn. 2004) (termination permitted only on statutory grounds)
- In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (interpretation of incarceration ground and best‑interest analysis guidance)
- White v. Moody, 171 S.W.3d 187 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (best‑interest inquiry must be viewed from child’s perspective)
- In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507 (Tenn. 2016) (appellate obligation to review each ground and best‑interest determination)