in Re Lone Star NGL Pipeline LP and ETP Crude LLC
11-20-00010-CV
Tex. App.Feb 3, 2020Background
- In 2011 Shumway granted an easement limited to natural gas and natural gas liquids; payments went to Shumway and Mary W. Watt/trust.
- Lone Star built a 50‑mile pipeline and later conveyed it to ETP, which began transporting crude oil in Jan 2018.
- ETP sought amendments to the easement; Watt demanded $500,000 cash + stock; negotiations failed.
- Real Parties (Watt heirs and Shumway) sued Relators (Lone Star and ETP) for trespass, breach, fraud, unjust enrichment, and sought a declaration that the easement terminated and an injunction stopping crude transport.
- ETP filed a counterclaim to condemn the right to transport crude under Chapter 21 and asked the trial court to fix security to protect the landowners; ETP submitted a low appraisal ($1,111) and Relators offered to post $1,000,000 if required.
- Judge Smith denied Relators’ motion to set security and to abate the injunction proceedings; Relators petitioned this Court for mandamus to vacate those rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Real Parties) | Defendant's Argument (Relators) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a district court must set security for a condemnor who files a condemnation counterclaim under §§21.003/21.017 without first following the standard §21.012–.016 procedure | The Standard Procedure applies first; condemnors must comply with §§21.012–.016 before obtaining possession or security | §§21.003 and 21.017 allow a condemnor to assert an alternative condemnation in a pending suit and the court must set security when requested | Court held the district court has jurisdiction and a ministerial duty to set adequate security under §§21.003/21.017/21.064(b) without prior completion of the Standard Procedure; trial court abused discretion by refusing to set security |
| Whether the Chapter 21 “Alternative Pleadings” mechanism is preempted by the Standard Procedure | Standard Procedure controls; otherwise condemnor could avoid statutory prerequisites | Alternative pleading (Article 3269 predecessor / §21.017) was meant as an alternative, expedited procedure; Standard Procedure does not nullify §21.003 | Court held the alternative procedure remains effective; §21.003 gives meaning only if it allows condemnation counterclaims without prior special‑commissioner process |
| Whether mandamus is an available and adequate remedy for refusal to set security | Mandamus is proper due to irreparable harm and the ministerial nature of setting security under prior authority | Trial court’s error could be remedied on appeal | Court held mandamus is appropriate and historically available to compel setting security; conditional writ granted if court fails to set security by deadline |
| Whether relators were entitled to an order abating the injunction proceedings until condemnation procedure/security was set | Relators asked to abate injunction proceedings pending condemnation/security | Real Parties argued trial court lacked jurisdiction to set security until Standard Procedure completed | Court denied mandamus relief as to the abatement request; Relators failed to show entitlement to have injunction abated |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Houston v. Adams, 279 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1955) (Article 3269 authorizes district‑court condemnation by cross‑action and allows court to require adequate security)
- Brazos River Conservation & Reclamation Dist. v. Costello, 143 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1940) (supreme court construing predecessor statute as an alternative, complete procedure permitting expedited condemnation and security)
- Jefferson Cty. Drainage Dist. No. 6 v. Gary, 362 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. 1962) (mandamus may compel trial court to set security under the predecessor statute)
- Coastal States Gas Producing Co. v. Miller, 329 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1959) (predecessor statute covers suits involving condemnation or injunction to prevent use of property)
- Amason v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 682 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1984) (standard condemnation procedure is an administrative hearing before special commissioners followed by judicial proceedings if objections are filed)
- Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmission Co., 141 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. 2004) (describing the two‑part standard condemnation procedure)
- Root Co. v. Montgomery Cty. Drainage Dist. No. 6, 584 S.W.2d 500 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1979) (Article 3269 did not require prior compliance with standard condemnation prerequisites)
- In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300 (Tex. 2016) (mandamus standards and relator’s burden)
- In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (trial court has no discretion to misapply the law; mandamus appropriate)
- Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (mandamus principles regarding legal error in trial court)
- Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. 2018) (statutory construction goal: give effect to legislative intent)
- Seals v. Upper Trinity Reg’l Water Dist., 145 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004) (no judicial jurisdiction over condemnation until objections to special‑commissioners’ award are filed)
