In Re: Leon A. Kendall v.
58 V.I. 718
| 3rd Cir. | 2013Background
- Kendall, a Virgin Islands Superior Court judge, was criminally convicted for contempt based on a Ford opinion criticizing the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s writ of mandamus.
- The Ford case involved defendants Ford and Paris, with Bethel as prosecutor; Kendall found the plea offer enforceable, then rejected it, prompting a mandamus petition.
- The Virgin Islands Supreme Court issued a mandamus directing Kendall not to enforce the plea, and Kendall later criticized that court in a published opinion.
- Kendall was charged with counts of indirect criminal contempt for obstructing justice (Count 1), failing to comply with the mandamus writ and recusing (Count 2), and misbehaving in official transactions (Count 3); the Third Circuit vacated convictions, holding Kendall’s speech was protected by the First Amendment.
- The majority reversed, holding that criminal contempt cannot punish expressive judicial speech absent a clear and present danger to justice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a sitting judge’s written opinion about pending cases is protected by the First Amendment from criminal contempt. | Kendall argues his First Amendment rights shielded his Ford opinion from contempt. | Virgin Islands Supreme Court contends speech about ongoing proceedings can be punished to protect justice. | Yes; First Amendment shields if no clear and present danger to justice. |
| Whether Kendall’s Ford opinion posed a clear and present danger to the Ford proceedings. | Prosecutors claim the opinion tainted proceedings and prejudiced outcomes. | Kendall contends the opinion did not delay or prejudice trial. | No clear and present danger; reversal of Count 1. |
| Whether Kendall’s recusal and failure to schedule trial were supported by sufficient evidence of willful disobedience of the writ. | Contempt based on recusal and noncompliance with mandamus. | Recusal and nonaction were not clearly mandated by the writ; evidence insufficient. | Insufficient evidence to uphold Count 2; vacate. |
| Whether the misbehaving in official transactions conviction was dependent on the others and should likewise be vacated. | Count 3 rests on Counts 1–2 findings. | If Counts 1–2 collapse, Count 3 fails. | Vacate Count 3 as derivative of Counts 1–2. |
| Whether judicial immunity applies to criminal contempt for a judge’s written opinion. | ACLU argues absolute immunity should shield Kendall. | Majority addresses immunity; to be decided separately. | Court does not decide immunity here; relies on First Amendment analysis for this case. |
Key Cases Cited
- Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994) (describes inherent contempt authority as necessary to exercise other judicial powers)
- Waste Conversion, Inc. v. Rollins Envtl. Servs., 893 F.3d 605 (3d Cir. 1990) (limited scope of contempt to vindicate court authority)
- Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (contempt power limited to protecting administration of justice; not public opinion)
- Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (expression in speech occupying highest First Amendment value; protected as speech)