In re L.R.
2014 ME 95
| Me. | 2014Background
- N.B., L.R.'s maternal grandmother, sought kinship placement for L.R. and the district court denied it in August 2013 after a two-day hearing.
- L.R. was placed in foster care in June 2012 due to concerns about C.R.'s medication compliance and caregiving choices; N.B. had previously assisted but became concerned for L.R.'s welfare.
- N.B. was granted intervenor status in June 2012; visitation with L.R. started at four hours weekly and gradually reduced to one hour of supervised visitation.
- Jeopardy orders were entered against L.R.'s parents in November 2012, initiating termination-like safeguards but not terminating parental rights.
- N.B. filed a December 2012 motion under 22 M.R.S. § 4005-E(2) seeking kinship placement; a placement hearing occurred July–August 2013, considering attachments to L.R. and N.B.'s relationship with C.R.
- After the district court denied kinship placement in August 2013, N.B. moved for reconsideration (denied October 2013) and appealed, leading to an interlocutory appeal that this Court ultimately dismissed under § 4006.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the appeal is interlocutory and barred by § 4006. | N.B. argues merits may be reached under traditional exceptions. | The statute bars all non-§4035/§4054/§4071 orders from appeal. | Interlocutory appeal barred; dismissal required. |
| Whether the death-knell or other exceptions permit merits review of an interlocutory kinship-placement denial. | Exceptions may allow review to prevent irreparable loss of parental-placement rights. | Statutory bar remains unless constitutional exception applies. | Death-knell exception not applicable; no merits review |
| Whether any final judgment rule exceptions can be crafted to overcome § 4006 in this context. | Courts may create exceptions when substantial rights would be irreparably harmed. | Legislature limited appeal rights; no practical exceptions exist absent constitutional questions. | Court cannot craft exceptions to § 4006 here |
| Whether the appeal would be permissible if constitutional concerns were raised and substantiated. | Potential due process concerns justify merits consideration. | No constitutional infirmity in § 4006; no exception applies. | No constitutional infirmity found; merits review not authorized |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Kristy Y., 2000 ME 98 (Me. 2000) (interlocutory appeals from child-protective orders generally barred by § 4006)
- In re Dustin C., 2008 ME 89 (Me. 2008) (statutory limits on appellate rights in child-protective cases; final judgment rule discussion)
- In re Johnna M., 2006 ME 46 (Me. 2006) (interlocutory appeal subject to dismissal under § 4006)
- In re Kristy Y., 2000 ME 98 (Me. 2000) (analysis of exceptions to final judgment rule in child-protective context)
- In re Bailey M., 2002 ME 12 (Me. 2002) (death-knell exception considered where irreparable harm would occur)
- In re Jacob C., 2009 ME 10 (Me. 2009) (statutory plain meaning governs appeal rights; § 4006 restrictions apply)
- Liberty v. Bennett, 2012 ME 81 (Me. 2012) (death-knell and irreparable harm considerations in review)
- Moshe Myerowitz, D.C., P.A. v. Howard, 507 A.2d 578 (Me. 1986) (appellate jurisdiction is statutory; cannot expand by judge-made exceptions)