In Re L.M.H.
E2017-00604-COA-R3-PT
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Sep 28, 2017Background
- Two children (L.M.H., born 2011; K.K.F., born 2015) were adjudicated dependent/neglected and placed in DCS custody after findings of mother’s prenatal drug use and father’s inadequate care; mother later surrendered her parental rights.
- Foster providers and a therapist reported multiple disclosures by L.M.H. (and corroboration by his half‑brother) that father physically and sexually exposed/abused him; the therapist diagnosed L.M.H. with PTSD and recommended long‑term therapy.
- A permanency plan (June 2015, ratified Sept. 2015) required father to obtain safe housing, complete mental‑health evaluation and recommended services, cooperate with DCS, attend parenting classes, and submit to drug/alcohol assessment/screens.
- Father repeatedly failed to comply with plan requirements, maintain consistent contact with DCS, secure appropriate housing (living in a hotel), or accept case management; visitation was suspended on therapist recommendation because visits worsened the children’s behavior.
- DCS petitioned (July 2016) to terminate father’s parental rights on grounds of persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, and severe child abuse; the juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence for each ground and that termination was in the children’s best interest.
- On appeal, the court affirmed as modified: it vacated the trial court’s finding under the statutory subdefinition tied to specific criminal statutes (§ 37‑1‑102(b)(22)(C)) but upheld termination based on persistence of conditions, substantial noncompliance, and severe abuse under the expert‑harm definition (§ 37‑1‑102(b)(22)(B)).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (DCS) | Defendant's Argument (J.M.F.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of children’s out‑of‑court statements under hearsay exception (Tenn. R. Evid. 803(25)) | Statements to foster mother and therapist were spontaneous, corroborated, trustworthy and admissible. | Statements were untrustworthy (child has history of lying; not taken in a neutral forensic interview; foster mother biased). | Admissibility upheld — trial court did not abuse discretion; statements were corroborated and trustworthy. |
| Res judicata or § 37‑1‑129(b)(2) bar to relitigating severe abuse allegation | N/A (DCS pursued severe‑abuse finding) | DCS should be barred: res judicata because issue could have been decided earlier; § 37‑1‑129(b)(2) required a severe‑abuse determination at the dependency hearing. | Father waived res judicata (not pled); § 37‑1‑129(b)(2) did not apply because prior hearing was not on the specified statutory dependency ground — no bar. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for severe child abuse (§ 37‑1‑102(b)(22)(B) and (C)) | Therapist’s diagnosis (PTSD), corroborated child disclosures, behavioral regression after visits, and father’s history support severe abuse. | Evidence insufficient; timing uncertain; child lies; foster mother biased; trial court failed to establish elements for criminal‑statute‑based subsection. | Trial court’s finding of severe abuse under the expert‑harm definition (22)(B) upheld. Finding under the criminal‑statute subsection (22)(C) vacated for lack of specific findings. |
| Grounds of termination and best interest (persistence of conditions; substantial noncompliance; best interest) | DCS: father failed to remedy conditions, substantially failed the permanency plan, and termination serves children’s best interests given safety and psychological harm. | Father: had employment; housing could be obtained; some plan tasks completed; argued trial court erred in findings and best‑interest conclusion. | Court affirmed termination: clear and convincing evidence supported persistence of conditions and substantial noncompliance; best‑interest factors favored termination. |
Key Cases Cited
- Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (fundamental parental right exists but is not absolute)
- In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240 (Tenn. 2010) (statutory framework and burden for termination; separate best‑interest analysis)
- In re Carrington, 483 S.W.3d 507 (Tenn. 2016) (appellate standard of review in termination cases)
- In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539 (Tenn. 2002) (measure noncompliance by degree and weight of plan requirements)
- Konvalinka v. Chattanooga‑Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 249 S.W.3d 346 (Tenn. 2008) (abuse of discretion standard explained)
- In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586 (Tenn. 2010) (clear and convincing evidence standard in parental termination)