73 A.3d 1015
D.C.2013Background
- L.B., a juvenile, was charged by petition with one count of making threats to do bodily harm, specifically alleging she threatened Sgt. Bedlion.
- At trial Sgt. Bedlion testified L.B. said “I’m going to slap your bitch ass” after he told her she could leave; L.B. admitted saying the words but testified they were directed at a bystander's boyfriend standing behind the officer.
- The trial judge found L.B. intended the utterance as a threat but concluded the intended target was the boyfriend, not Bedlion, and adjudged delinquent for threats.
- L.B. appealed, arguing she was convicted of a crime (threatening the boyfriend) that was not charged (threatening Bedlion), violating her due-process notice rights.
- The court reviewed de novo and treated the victim’s identity as analogous to an element for distinguishing separately chargeable threats, reversing the adjudication as an impermissible constructive amendment/variance without notice or amendment motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (L.B.) | Defendant's Argument (Government/Trial Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether convicting L.B. for threatening a person other than the named victim in the petition violated due process/constituted a constructive amendment | Conviction rested on a different victim than charged; she lacked notice and thus due process | Identity of victim is not a formal element of the offense; trial court may find actual target based on evidence | Reversed: conviction substituted an uncharged victim for the named victim, amounting to constructive amendment/variance requiring reversal |
| Whether variance was harmless or curable by amendment under juvenile rules | Waiver of Fifth and testimony aside, she had no notice she could be punished for threatening the boyfriend | Petition provided adequate notice of the single incident; identity here did not prejudice substantial rights | Majority: not harmless—no motion to amend, no notice or time to prepare; reversal required |
| Whether existing precedent treats victim identity as legally significant for multiple offenses | L.B.: Victim identity distinguishes separately chargeable threats; conviction must track charging document | Government: victim identity is not an element, so proof of threat suffices regardless of named victim | Court: precedent treats victim identity as analogous to an element for separating distinct offenses; supports reversal |
| Standard of review and preservation of objection | L.B.: preserved through testimony/defense theory; de novo review appropriate | Government: claim not preserved; plain-error standard applies | Court applied de novo review and reached reversal (found appellate theory adequately presented) |
Key Cases Cited
- Adams v. United States, 466 A.2d 439 (D.C. 1983) (separate convictions upheld where offenses required proof of facts the other did not because victims differed)
- Joiner v. United States, 585 A.2d 176 (D.C. 1991) (separate threats convictions where defendant singled out distinct victims during same encounter)
- Long v. United States, 687 A.2d 1331 (D.C. 1996) (constructive amendment where proof changed identity of intended robbery victim from indictment)
- Joseph v. United States, 597 A.2d 14 (D.C. 1991) (constructive amendment where intent was proved as to a different victim than named)
- In re W.B.W., 397 A.2d 143 (D.C. 1979) (juvenile adjudications rejected where petition gave no notice of essential element)
- Joiner-Die v. United States, 899 A.2d 762 (D.C. 2006) (elements of threats; victim need not hear the threat)
- Hanna v. United States, 666 A.2d 845 (D.C. 1995) (convictions for crimes involving distinct identifiable victims do not merge)
- Snowden v. United States, 52 A.3d 858 (D.C. 2012) (multiple assaults where defendant moved weapon between different people constituted separate offenses)