In Re: Keith Devon Adams
825 F.3d 1283
11th Cir.2016Background
- Keith Devon Adams was sentenced under the ACCA after a conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm; the PSR listed three prior convictions including a 2005 Florida burglary of an unoccupied dwelling.
- Adams objected at sentencing to using his Florida burglary as an ACCA predicate; the district court overruled the objection but did not specify which ACCA clause it relied on.
- ACCA defines a "violent felony" via (1) the elements clause, (2) the enumerated-crimes clause, and (3) the residual clause (the clause invalidated in Johnson).
- Under Florida law, burglary includes entry into a building or its curtilage or a conveyance; prior precedent treated Florida burglary as outside "generic burglary" and hence as an ACCA predicate via the residual clause.
- In light of Johnson (invalidating the residual clause) and Descamps (on categorical approach/divisibility), Adams argued his ACCA enhancement is void; he sought authorization to file a successive §2255 based on Johnson.
- The Eleventh Circuit granted authorization to file, concluding Adams made a prima facie showing that his burglary predicate may have depended on the now-invalid residual clause and thus warrants further district-court review.
Issues
| Issue | Adams' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Adams may file a second or successive §2255 motion asserting Johnson invalidates his ACCA enhancement | Johnson voids the ACCA residual clause; Adams' Florida burglary likely relied on that clause and thus enhancement is invalid | Existing precedent at sentencing supported treating Florida burglary as a residual-clause predicate; enhancement stands absent a clear error | Authorized filing: Adams made a prima facie showing that Johnson may invalidate his ACCA-enhanced sentence, so district court should review |
| Whether the burglary conviction qualifies under ACCA's elements clause | Florida burglary lacks a force element; thus it does not meet the elements clause | At sentencing, burglary was treated as a predicate (implicitly via residual clause or otherwise) | Elements clause likely inapplicable because Florida statute lacks the required force element |
| Whether the burglary qualifies under ACCA's enumerated-crimes (generic burglary) clause | Florida burglary covers curtilage and is broader than generic burglary; so it likely does not qualify | If the record showed the conviction matched generic burglary, enumerated clause could apply | Under James and Descamps analysis, Florida burglary likely falls outside generic burglary, so enumerated clause likely inapplicable |
| Whether Descamps is an independent basis for relief or simply guidance in assessing a Johnson claim | Adams relies on Johnson; Descamps guides the categorical/divisibility analysis but is not an independent gatekeeping claim | Government argued Descamps alone cannot satisfy §2255(h) | Court treated Descamps as interpretive guidance relevant to Johnson analysis but not an independent claim under §2255(h) |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (holding ACCA residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
- Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson announced a new substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (categorical approach and divisibility analysis for predicate-offense identification)
- James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007) (Florida burglary broader than generic burglary because of curtilage)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (definition of generic burglary for ACCA enumerated clause)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (analysis of whether the least conduct criminalized matches the generic offense)
- Jordan v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs., 485 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2007) (standard for prima facie showing to authorize successive petitions)
- United States v. Matthews, 466 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2006) (Florida burglary of curtilage treated as ACCA residual-clause predicate)
- In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2003) (standard requiring sufficient showing of possible merit)
- In re Moss, 703 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2013) (district court reviews issues de novo after circuit's prima facie authorization)