In Re Kalar
162 N.H. 314
| N.H. | 2011Background
- Petitioner Patricia M. Kalar, a disabled mother, received Food Stamp Act benefits since at least April 2006.
- DHHS conducted income/expense inquiries in July 2006 and issued an NOD reducing benefits due to denied deductions.
- After a pre-hearing conference, DHHS allowed disputed deductions and reinstated original allotment without a hearing.
- In July 2008, recertification inquiries yielded $2024.35/month in allowable excess medical deductions, allotting $463/month.
- A February 2009 recertification led to a March 2009 NOD reducing benefits to $87/month because certain deductions were deemed non-permissible excess medical deductions.
- Hearings officer later allowed transportation to medical appointments as excess medical deduction, but disallowed other categories (private school tuition, school transportation, cellular service, bowling/sports).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether private school tuition qualifies as excess medical deduction. | Kalar argues tuition is medically necessary. | Department disallowed as not among allowed categories. | Tuition not an excess medical deduction. |
| Whether school transportation, cellular service, and bowling/sports qualify as excess medical deductions. | These expenses are medically necessary and should be deductible. | Not listed as allowable deductions. | None of these qualify as excess medical deductions. |
| Whether transportation to medical appointments qualifies as excess medical deduction. | Transportation to medical care should be deductible. | Only certain transportation costs qualify. | Transportation to medical appointments qualifies as an excess medical deduction at specified rate. |
| Whether department's prior allowance of disputed deductions estops current denial (collateral estoppel). | Past allowance should bar current denial. | Agency must follow federal regs; past allowance not final resolution. | Collateral estoppel inapplicable; no final adverse adjudication. |
| Whether department's actions violated Title II of the ADA. | Discrimination based on disability in denying deductions. | No denial of meaningful access; deductions limited to elderly/disabled category. | No ADA violation; program access not denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Petition of Chase Home for Children, 155 N.H. 528, 926 A.2d 287 (2007) (N.H. 2007) (review standards; agency action reviewed on certiorari for legality or arbitrariness)
- Petition of Walker, 138 N.H. 471, 641 A.2d 1021 (1994) (N.H. 1994) (limited scope of certiorari review of department decisions)
- Appeal of Carnahan, 160 N.H. 73, 993 A.2d 224 (2010) (N.H. 2010) (agency must exercise recertification powers; estoppel does not apply to reset issues under law)
- DHB v. Town of Pembroke, 152 N.H. 314, 876 A.2d 206 (2005) (N.H. 2005) (administrative gloss doctrine requires ambiguity; absence of ambiguity forecloses gloss)
- Petition of Concord Teachers, 158 N.H. 529, 969 A.2d 403 (2009) (N.H. 2009) (collateral estoppel framework applicability)