In re K.A.S., 2016 UT 55

Background

In Sept. 2013 the child’s stepfather (C.D.M.) filed to adopt K.A.S.; the biological father (L.E.S.) timely contested and the petitioners moved to terminate his parental rights.
The district court initially found L.E.S. indigent and appointed counsel after the deputy county attorney (Drechsel) advised the court that Uintah County would pay for counsel.
Drechsel later moved to intervene and argued appointment was erroneous under the Juvenile Court Act; appointed counsel did not oppose that motion and the court vacated the appointment.
L.E.S., incarcerated during the proceedings, attempted to retain counsel, filed a continuance request, and proceeded pro se after the court denied a continuance and ordered a termination hearing.
The district court terminated L.E.S.’s parental rights on Nov. 24, 2014; L.E.S. appealed. The Utah Supreme Court exercised the exceptional‑circumstances doctrine, applied Lassiter/Eldridge balancing, and held federal due process required counsel and that the denial was reversible error.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Preservation — may court reach unpreserved constitutional claim?	Exceptional circumstances excused preservation because appointed counsel failed to defend appointment and plaintiff was thereafter barred from making the argument pro se.	Appeal should be dismissed for failure to preserve; no recognized exception applies.	Court applied the exceptional‑circumstances exception and reached the constitutional claim.
Federal due process right to appointed counsel in district court parental‑termination proceeding (Lassiter/Eldridge)	Lassiter balancing (private interest, state interest, risk of error) overcomes presumption against appointment; L.E.S. had a right to counsel and was denied it.	Presumption against appointment applies; case was straightforward and like Lassiter, counsel not required.	Court held Eldridge factors weighed for appointment; denial of counsel violated federal due process; reversed and remanded.
Ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to preserve)	Appointed counsel’s failure to oppose county’s motion effectively deprived L.E.S. of counsel and ability to preserve the right.	Ineffective‑assistance doctrine not properly invoked in civil context to excuse preservation.	Court did not rest disposition on ineffective assistance as primary ground; relied on exceptional circumstances and due process analysis.
State constitutional and equal protection challenges to statutory scheme	Argued state due process and equal protection require appointment or statutory scheme is unconstitutional.	Appellees argued no such constitutional right; statutes control juvenile practice.	Court avoided deciding state‑due‑process and equal‑protection questions on avoidance grounds after finding federal due process violation; remanded for further proceedings including indigence determination.

Key Cases Cited

Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1981) (establishes Eldridge balancing and presumption against appointed counsel in civil cases absent factors overcoming presumption)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (sets the three‑part due process balancing test: private interest, governmental interest, risk of erroneous deprivation)
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (U.S. 1972) (recognizes parental rights as fundamental liberty interests)
In re J.D.M., 810 P.2d 494 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (addressing availability of attorney fees post‑termination proceedings)
Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 163 P.3d 615 (Utah 2007) (clarifies that motions for reconsideration are not recognized under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure)