In Re Julian D.
2011 R.I. LEXIS 44
R.I.2011Background
- DCYF filed a petition on Jan 15, 2009 to involuntarily terminate Vallejo's parental rights to Julian.
- Grounds: § 15-7-7(a)(3) (twelve months in DCYF custody and reasonable efforts to reunify) and § 15-7-7(a)(4) (abandonment).
- Family Court held a trial on Jun 2, 2009; Vallejo and the assigned social worker testified.
- Vallejo admitted paternity; he had prior sexual assault charges and was incarcerated during part of the proceedings.
- DCYF offered services including a Dr. Parsons parent-child evaluation and recommendations for sexual-offender treatment, which Vallejo did not complete.
- Trial judge terminated Vallejo’s rights on the bench, later memorialized in a written decree on Jun 9, 2009; Vallejo appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 15-7-7(a)(3) warranted termination | Vallejo argues DCYF failed to prove twelve months, offer of services, or lack of reasonable probability. | DCYF contends twelve months proven, services offered, and no reasonable probability of reunification. | Yes; § 15-7-7(a)(3) satisfied (twelve months, reasonable services, no likely return). |
| Whether DCYF offered reasonable services to correct the situation | Vallejo asserts services were insufficient or not properly offered. | DCYF offered sexual-offender evaluation/treatment and other supports; Vallejo refused. | Yes; services were reasonable and offered; Vallejo’s refusal supports termination. |
| Whether there was a substantial probability the child could not be returned safely | Vallejo maintained potential for reunification if services were completed. | Given Vallejo’s refusal of treatment and safety concerns, no substantial probability of return. | Correct; no substantial probability of return within a reasonable time. |
| Whether § 15-7-7(a)(4) abandonment was proven | Vallejo abandoned Julian by ceasing contact during incarceration. | DCYF need not prove abandonment if § 15-7-7(a)(3) proven; abandonment need not be addressed independently. | Not necessary to decide; § 15-7-7(a)(3) upheld the termination. |
| Best interests of the child | Terminating would not be in Julian’s best interests given adoption prospects. | Stable pre-adoptive placement with loving foster family served Julian’s best interests; Vallejo’s noncompliance worsened prospects. | Julian’s best interests favored termination and continuation with the foster/adoptive placement. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Dayvon G., 10 A.3d 448 (R.I.2010) (establishes standard for best interests and § 15-7-7(a)(3) criteria)
- In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200 (R.I.1989) (reasonableness of offered services under § 15-7-7(a)(3))
- In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301 (R.I.2003) (services must be reasonable to correct the situation and reunify)
- In re Rosalie H., 889 A.2d 199 (R.I.2006) (court upholds agency’s provision of sexual-offender counseling when necessary for reunification)
- In re Amber P., 877 A.2d 608 (R.I.2005) (parents’ cooperation with services is essential for reunification; lack of participation endangers child)
- In re Daniel D., 9 A.3d 651 (R.I.2010) (standard of review; deference to trial court findings in termination cases)
- In re Ariel N., 892 A.2d 80 (R.I.2006) (due-process considerations in termination hearings when counsel participates)
- State v. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d 1328 (R.I.1983) (bench- vs. written-order clarifications in appellate review)