In Re Jones, 670 F.3d 265

Jones was acquitted on several drug charges but convicted in a 2008 retrial on conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, receiving a life sentence.
Between trials, Jones, proceeding pro se, alleged Fourth Amendment warrantless searches of his apartment and a warehouse in his name, seeking damages and an investigation.
On May 28, 2008, after Jones's second conviction, the district court sua sponte dismissed the civil case under Heck v. Humphrey.
Jones filed a January 31, 2009 motion styled as a Motion for Leave to File Notice of Appeal pro se, claiming excusable delay; the district court denied in February 2009.
Jones filed what was treated as a Notice of Appeal; the petition for mandamus was denied because the filing deadline rules could not be extended under the cited authorities.
The court noted that Heck may not bar every § 1983 claim where evidence links to a state criminal trial, and acknowledged potential post-reversal remedies if the underlying conviction were vacated.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether mandamus was proper to review the denial of leave to file an appeal	Jones asserts excusable delay and seeks review of denial	District court properly denied leave; timing rules not satisfied	Denied mandamus; jurisdictional and timing grounds insufficient
Whether January Motion was timely under Rule 4(a) or Rule 60(b)	Timing should start when Jones learned of the dismissal or when he received the opinion, or treated as Rule 60(b)(1)	Neither theory valid under governing statutes and deadlines	Timeliness theories rejected; not timely under Rule 4(a) or 60(b)(1)
Whether the January Motion could be construed as a Rule 60(b) motion	Motion for relief from judgment could be liberally construed	Motion was for appellate review, not relief from judgment	Not construed as Rule 60(b); appropriate to deny mandamus
Whether Heck dismissal can be reviewed in this context	Heck should not bar potential constitutional claims if not necessarily invalidating conviction	Heck governs; petition moot given dismissal status	Mandamus denied without reaching Heck merits
Potential post-reversal remedies if underlying conviction is reversed	May pursue Rule 60(b)(5) or refile after reversal	Not addressed here; depends on subsequent developments	Discussion noted; not a decision on merits

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1994) (damages claims may be barred where conviction would be invalid)
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (U.S. 1988) (pro se notice of appeal filed when delivered to prison authorities)
In re Sealed Case (Bowles), 624 F.3d 482 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (reopening deadlines under 28 U.S.C. § 2107 and associated rules)
Hall v. CIA, 437 F.3d 94 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (liberal construction of pro se filings; may still refuse relief)
Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (liberally construed pro se motions; some become Rule 60(b))
Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (U.S. 2007) (tolling of statutes of limitations when Heck prevents suit from proceeding)
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (post-conviction reversal or vacatur can affect civil action timing)