In Re Jones
652 F.3d 36
D.C. Cir.2011Background
- Jones petitioned for a writ of mandamus and for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) to file a §1983 damages action; he was incarcerated at USP Florence, Colorado.
- The court had held Jones I in abeyance pending whether the PLRA filing-fee requirements apply to mandamus petitions seeking to compel district court filings.
- An April 25, 2011 show-cause order noted Jones had at least three prior actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim under §1915(g).
- Four prior §1983 actions were cited, with at least three dismissed under Heck v. Humphrey for prematurity (failure to show invalidity of a conviction).
- Heck v. Humphrey limits §1983 damages when an underlying criminal judgment would be invalidated by the §1983 action unless the conviction has been reversed or otherwise called into question.
- The court concluded that Jones’s three-strikes status remained despite the later reversal of his conviction, and denied leave to appeal in forma pauperis unless the full fee is paid.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Heck-based dismissals count as PLRA strikes. | Jones (Jones) argues these dismissals do count as strikes. | Jones II and doctrinal consensus treat Heck dismissals as strikes. | Yes; Heck-based dismissals count as strikes under §1915(g). |
| Whether Jones had three strikes, triggering §1915(g) denial. | Jones contends his claims merit consideration; strikes were not properly tallied. | Three Heck-based dismissals qualify as strikes, foreclosing IFP. | Jones had three strikes; IFP denial sustained. |
| Whether the Heck prematurity bars §1983 claims but may be avoided by showing genuine danger. | Prematurity bars apply; extraordinary danger exception is not invoked. | Prematurity forecloses claims absent imminent danger. | Prematurity bars apply; no imminent danger shown to except §1915(g). |
| Whether reversal of Jones's conviction affects the analysis. | Reversal later undermines the premise of prematurity. | Post-reversal status does not retroactively negate §1915(g) prematurity. | Reversal does not alter §1915(g) strike status for prematurity. |
| What is the court's ultimate decision on Jones's motion to proceed IFP on mandamus petition. | Request should be granted; fee not justifiable without strikes analysis. | Three strikes require payment of full appellate fee before consideration. | Denied; Jones must pay the full fee before the court will consider the mandamus petition. |
Key Cases Cited
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (prematurity and requirement of invalidating conviction for §1983 damages actions; termination element in malicious prosecutions)
- Smith v. Veterans Admin., 636 F.3d 1306 (10th Cir. 2011) ( Heck prematurity treated as a strike under §1915(g))
- Davis v. Kan. Dept. of Corr., 507 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007) (prematurity treated as a strike under §1915(g))
- Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99 (5th Cir. 1996) (supports treating Heck-based dismissals as strikes)
- McCurdy v. Sheriff of Madison County, 128 F.3d 1144 (7th Cir. 1997) (same principle on strikes under §1915(g))
- United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (reversal of conviction discussed post-§1915(g) analysis)