275 A.3d 268
D.C.2022Background:
- Johnson represented H.G. (a former D.C. public-school bus driver) in a workers’ compensation appeal from June 2012 until August 2015.
- In July 2014 Johnson received a $58,050.63 check for H.G.’s award, endorsed it with H.G., and accepted $19,350.21 (one-third) as his fee while giving H.G. the remainder and $1,000 cash.
- Johnson did not inform H.G. of D.C. Code § 1-623.27’s 20% cap, ALJ approval requirement, or that fees must be paid by the D.C. government; he later sought a lien from the administrator without disclosing the prior payment.
- Johnson filed a fee petition after taking the payment that failed to disclose the $19,350.21 received, included hours not actually performed, and sought fees in excess of the statutory cap.
- During investigation and at hearing Johnson made evasive or false statements to the ALJ, new counsel, and Disciplinary Counsel about the fee and his work; the Committee and Board found multiple rule violations and recommended disbarment.
- The court held the Board’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence, sustained violations of multiple Rules (1.4(b), 1.5(a), 3.3(a)(1), 8.1(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d)), disbarred Johnson, and ordered restitution of $19,350.21 to the Clients’ Security Fund as a condition of reinstatement.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to communicate (Rule 1.4(b)) | Johnson knew of the statutory limits and failed to inform H.G., instead taking an unlawful fee. | Johnson did not adequately challenge the underlying facts; he asserted other defenses (misidentification, etc.). | Court held Johnson violated Rule 1.4(b); his nondisclosure was motivated by self-interest. |
| Unreasonable fee (Rule 1.5(a)) | Fee was per se unreasonable because it exceeded the statutory 20% cap and was sought for minimal or unperformed work. | Johnson claimed the fee petition was meant to reimburse H.G. for fees already taken. | Court held fee unlawful and per se unreasonable; fee petition also contained charges for unperformed work. |
| False statements to tribunal (Rule 3.3(a)(1)) | Johnson submitted an inflated fee petition and false factual assertions to tribunals. | Johnson disputed amounts and characterization, but offered inconsistent testimony. | Court found submission of a knowingly false fee petition violated Rule 3.3(a)(1). |
| Dishonesty/deceit (Rule 8.4(c)) | Johnson knowingly misrepresented his role, receipt of funds, and work performed to counsel and tribunal. | Johnson argued misidentification and other procedural errors tainted proceedings. | Court held Johnson engaged in flagrant dishonesty in violation of Rule 8.4(c). |
| Failure to disclose/respond in disciplinary matter (Rule 8.1(b)) | Johnson denied taking the stated fee and failed to correct misapprehensions; he was evasive with Disciplinary Counsel. | Johnson argued procedural and identification errors; he did not meaningfully rebut the evidence. | Court held Johnson violated Rule 8.1(b) by knowingly failing to disclose facts necessary to correct a misapprehension. |
| Interference with administration of justice / sanction | Misconduct prejudiced client, clogged proceedings, and was concealed—warranting disbarment and restitution. | Johnson raised constitutional and process objections and claimed reimbursement intent; arguments were undeveloped or unsupported. | Court concluded conduct seriously interfered with justice, adopted disbarment and restitution condition. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Cleaver-Bascombe I, 892 A.2d 396 (charging for unperformed work is per se unreasonable)
- In re Ekekwe-Kauffman, 210 A.3d 775 (lawyer’s duty to explain matters and initiate necessary communications)
- In re Ukwu, 926 A.2d 1106 (false statements to a tribunal are an extremely serious violation)
- In re Romansky, 825 A.2d 311 (distinguishing dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation)
- In re Howes, 39 A.3d 1 (disbarment appropriate for intentional/reckless misappropriation or flagrant dishonesty)
- In re McClure, 144 A.3d 570 (Board’s recommended sanction is presumptively appropriate if within acceptable range)
- In re Omwenga, 49 A.3d 1235 (restitution may be required as a condition of reinstatement for misappropriation)